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PRECEDENT AS RATIONAL PERSUASION 
Brian N. Larson*
Abstract 
The ways that judges and lawyers make and justify their 
arguments and decisions have profound impacts on our lives. 
Understanding those practices in light of theories of 
reasoning and argumentation is thus critical for 
understanding law and the society it shapes. An inquiry that 
explores the very foundations of all legal reasoning leads to 
a broad, important question: How do lawyers and judges use 
cited cases in their legal arguments? It turns out there is 
practically no empirical research to suggest the answer. As 
the first step in a comprehensive empirical effort to answer 
this question, this article performs a ground-breaking 
analysis of a carefully constructed corpus of judicial opinions 
and the advocates’ briefs that gave rise to them. It tells us not 
just that these textual artifacts cited court opinions, but how 
they used the opinions in their reasoning. The article then 
reveals whether judges and advocates placed different values 
on different ways of using cited cases. These legal authors 
used them to make assertions about legal rules in their 
arguments about twice as often as they used them as legal 
analogies and about four times as often as they used them to 
make policy arguments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
practices of judges differed significantly from those of 
advocates. But so, too, did those of the prevailing advocates 
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and their less fortunate opponents. On functional grounds, 
therefore, this article empirically supports the claim that 
there is a hierarchy of rational legal argumentative appeals, 
and that there is a common look to the ‘losing brief.’ This 
special convergence between theory and function can 
transform ongoing debates across legal scholarship on the 
value of drawing on precedent as a tool for rational 
persuasion. 
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Introduction 
The ways that judges justify their decisions have profound 
impacts on our lives. Notionally, at least, the reasoning that judges 
use should be rational, if not logical. One role of the attorney in 
litigation is to supply the judge an acceptable route to the outcome 
that the advocate’s client seeks—signposts in the form of arguments. 
These signposts, too, should be rational. An important way that 
lawyers and judges make arguments is by using prior court opinions 
that they cite in their arguments. This leads to an important question: 
How do lawyers and judges use cited cases in their legal arguments? 
Legal theorists have spilled a great deal of ink and a great many bytes 
of digital text over the question of what counts as a rational argument, 
which arguments have “rational force,” whether all legal arguments 
should be deductive in form, etc.1 I call these questions 
‘metanormative.’2 They are normative questions—explored by legal 
philosophers and legal theorists—about what norms legal authors—
judges and advocates—should embrace in their reasoning. Norms 
about norms. But empirical evidence about what norms legal authors 
do embrace in their reasoning should inform metanormative 
thinking. 
I do not claim that merely because a certain way of arguing is 
1 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 90 (1990); NEIL
MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL
REASONING 53–54 (2005). See generally Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993); Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. 
REV. 57 (1996); Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, 
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF
ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT (2d ed. 2016); Brian N. Larson, Law’s 
Enterprise: Argumentation Schemes and Legal Analogy, 7 U. CIN. L. REV. 
663 (2018).  
2 I use this convention: I use double quotation marks only for material I quote 
from other authorities. References to the name of a concept or any word or 
phrase not quoted from other authorities appear in single quotation marks. 
Italics indicate emphasis. Cf. Brewer, supra note 1, at 931 n.14. So I might 
write:  
While Smith called these theories “norms about norms,” I call them 
‘metanormative’ and acknowledge that neither usage is widely 
accepted. 
I also adopt the convention of using third-person plural pronouns (‘they,’ 
‘them,’ etc.) when referring to individual persons of unknown gender. 
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prevalent among lawyers and judges it therefore ought to be. That 
argument would lose its head to Hume’s Guillotine.3  
But the argument supporting the claim that legal practice should 
inform legal theory goes this way: Legal argumentation is practical 
argumentation. In that context, if an argument form can be rationally 
justified on the metanormative plane and lawyers and judges accept 
it in fact on the practical or plain-old normative plane, the argument 
form should be metanormatively acceptable.4 If that perspective is 
correct, the argumentative practices of judges and lawyers should 
inform metanormative legal theory: If lawyers and judges use an 
argument form, metanormative theory needs to assess whether it is 
rational. If metanormative theory predicts or requires certain 
argument forms that lawyers don’t use, then the metanormative 
theory must at least account for its inability to model lawyers’ 
practices. In that case, we should expect the practices of judges and 
advocates to represent their normative preferences—and thus the 
practical norms of legal reasoning.5 Part I develops this argument 
further. 
Legal theory offers metanormative claims about how lawyers 
should argue by asserting, for example, that certain types of 
arguments should be the most rationally persuasive and that certain 
principles must guide the use of legal analogies.6 There is practically 
very little research, however, about how lawyers do use cases. That 
research would take a form I would call ‘empirical legal theory’: the 
exploration of questions relating to norms of legal theory, as they are 
manifest in practice, using empirical materials and methods.7  
3 ‘Hume’s Guillotine’ refers to the mistake of inferring normative principles 
solely from empirical observations of what is. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1896) (“[T]he author proceeds for 
some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and . . . makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change 
is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.”). 
4 It can still be a quite-bad argument, especially if its premises are not true 
or if it is presented incoherently by its proponent. 
5 WEINREB, supra note 1, at 10 (making the same argument by implication); 
Larson, supra note 1, at 692–701 (making the argument expressly); Susan E. 
Provenzano & Brian N. Larson, Civil Procedure as a Critical Discussion, 20 
NEV. L.J. 967, 978–79 (2020) (same). 
6 Part I also explores those claims. 
7 This is a broader term than “experimental jurisprudence,” which appears 
to be the application of experimental empirical methods to legal theory. See, 
e.g., Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning: An Experimental
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‘How do judges and advocates use cases?’ is a big question. 
The problem is that there is no extant study of how lawyers and 
judges use cases in their arguments—period.8 Worse, there are no 
extant research methods for characterizing case uses in a way that is 
useful for answering the questions of empirical legal theory. There is 
no method for ‘coding’ them, as a qualitative researcher would say.9 
Available research methods are inadequate to the task of answering 
these questions because they are either too coarsely or too finely 
grained. Typically, the existing methods are coarsely grained and have 
involved assessing only whether an argument cites a particular case 
anywhere at all, without regard to how many times the argument cites 
it or how it uses it.10 These methods are focused on establishing 
pecking orders: which opinions, articles, and other authorities courts 
cite most often and are therefore most influential. Empirical legal 
theory requires a finer grain of analysis than this. In the alternative, 
large-scale assessments of legal arguments sometimes approach them 
from a rhetorical or stylistic perspective, but these studies often dwell 
on minute stylistic details and do not tell us much about the practical 
norms of rational persuasion.11 Empirical legal theory requires a 
coarser grain of analysis than this.  
This study identified five common types of case use in a study of 
199 artifacts—the textual documents that were the objects of study 
here. A case use consists of all citations to and discussion of a court 
opinion in a section of a legal argument to support the assertion of the 
author’s claim in that section of argument. The artifacts here were 199 
advocates’ briefs and the court opinions they precipitated, which I 
hand-coded.12  
Assessment of What Dictionary Definitions and Linguistic Usage Data Tell 
Legal Interpreters, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020) (examining laypersons’, 
lawyers’, and judges’ responses to definitions of terms—“ordinary 
meaning”—under experimental conditions). 
8 See the review of literature in Part II.B. 
9 This ‘coding’ means the assignment of category labels, not authoring 
computer code. “A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or short 
phrase that symbolically assigns a summative . . . attribute for a portion of 
language-based . . . data.” JOHNNY SALDAÑA, THE CODING MANUAL FOR
QUALITATIVE RESEARCHERS 4 (3d ed. 2016). 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 50 through 53. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 66 through 68. 
12 Typically, I will use the first-person singular pronoun throughout this 
paper when referring to efforts on this study, as I am its sole author. As the 
detailed coding guide in the data repository notes, however, most of the text 
segmenting and coding tasks undertaken here involved two coders working 
together, usually one of my excellent research assistants on the one hand and 
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In these artifacts, four types of case use made rational 
argumentative appeals: supporting assertion of a rule, supporting a 
policy statement, supporting a generalization about prior cases, and 
functioning as an example of how to apply a rule, policy, or standard 
(what I call a ‘legal analogy’). A fifth type consisted of citing a case 
because the author quoted it. And a sixth catch-all type existed for 
types of use that did not fall into these categories.13 The list of four 
rational appeals proved robust for coding. Of 5638 case uses in the 
199 document artifacts here, only 383 (or 6.8%) failed to fall into at 
least one of those categories, and more than 1500 fell into two or more 
of them.  
When it comes to the ways that advocates and judges used these 
cases, there was a clear pecking order across all artifacts: Rule-based 
case uses were twice as common as legal analogies, which were twice 
as common as policy arguments. This article therefore provides 
support to one meta-normative theory, the hierarchy of rational 
appeals for which Professor Susan Provenzano and I have argued.14 It 
may not be surprising that court opinions, which seek to project an 
air of authority, used cases significantly more often than advocates’ 
briefs to support rule statements and significantly less often to 
provide examples of the application of rules. This article also shows 
how the practices of prevailing advocates differed significantly from 
those of the losing attorneys, suggesting that so-called ‘losing briefs’ 
might have a certain look to them. It also notes that advocates of 
parties moving for relief made different uses of cases than those 
opposing such motions and that authors in some jurisdictions 
employed cases differently than those in others. 
These findings should shape scholarship about legal theory, 
holding it to account for its (in)consistency with legal practice. 
Advocates may be interested to learn how the briefs of prevailing 
attorneys varied from those of their opponents. Teachers of legal 
theory and practice may wish to guide students toward practices that 
are typical of the professionals the students wish to become; on the 
other hand, they may wish to oppose the typical performances on 
display here and argue that there are better practices. This article 
concludes with a call to extend this research, binding legal theory and 
me on the other. Brian N. Larson, Coding Guide & Replication Data for 
“Precedent as Rational Persuasion,” TEXAS DATA REPOSITORY DATAVERSE 
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://doi.org/10.18738/T8/SXNR02. All the data files 
used in preparing this article and all the textual artifacts coded in creation of 
those data also appear in the data repository. Id. 
13 See infra Part II.C. 
14 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 978–79. 
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practice to each other through empirical research. 
In Part II, this article develops a set of methods for studying 
empirical legal theory. That part provides a detailed explanation of 
methods used here to assist other researchers in reproducing or 
criticizing them. I ground these methods in contemporary 
argumentation theory and adapt them from methods in applied 
linguistics and writing studies. Part III then reports the principal 
findings. It answers two research questions, the first—using a pilot 
study to identify categories of case use—as a preliminary exploration 
of the second, a presentation of the relative frequency with which 
judges and advocates made these types of use of cases.15 Part III also 
revisits the question of what kinds of use authors put cases to, 
considering whether case uses that did not fall into one of the four 
rational appeals identified here might exhibit some other pattern. 
Part IV then discusses the findings.  
I. Theoretical & Empirical Contexts
This article provides partial answers to the very broad question: 
How do judges and advocates use cases in their arguments? No 
single study will answer that question completely. The question is 
what Professor Merton called an “originating question,” or what the 
researcher “wants to know.”16 Fact-focused studies are necessary to 
lay a foundation for explanations, because law scholars are too ready 
“to assume that they know the facts about the workings of [law] 
without special investigation, because [law] is, after all, their native 
habitat.”17 This part briefly explains one particular theory about how 
judges and advocates argue and identifies two resulting research 
questions that this study took on. Here “[t]he originating question 
must . . . be recast to indicate the observations that will provide a 
provisional answer to it,” which usually “requires a search for 
empirical materials through which the problem can be investigated to 
good advantage.”18 We must explore the general problem in some 
particular instance(s). 
The theory at issue here is the theory of legal topoi, which 
identifies three broad categories into which rational legal arguments 
must fall—empirical, conventional, and values-based—and places 
them in a hierarchy, with the first of them more rationally persuasive 
15 See infra Part I.A. 
16 Robert K. Merton, Introduction: Notes on Problem-Finding in Sociology, 
in SOCIOLOGY TODAY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS ix, xiii (Robert K. Merton et 
al., eds., 1959). 
17 Id. at xv (describing fact-focused studies in the context of sociology). 
18 Id. at xxvi. 
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than the second, and the second more than the third.19 Part I.A. 
describes that theory in more detail and grounds the research 
questions for this study in it. Part I.B. considers previous studies of 
legal argumentation and what they can tell us about these questions. 
Before proceeding to those discussions, though, it is important to 
identify a basic framework for discussing legal argumentation and for 
motivating empirical study of argumentation within that framework. 
Argumentation is “a series of propositional sentences—called 
‘premises’—arranged in a form that supports the truth or acceptability 
of another propositional sentence, called a ‘conclusion.’”20 As a 
consequence of this definition, “any written or spoken legal analysis—
whether it appears in a memorandum analyzing some aspect of the 
law, a lawyer’s brief written to persuade to a court, or a court’s opinion 
written to justify or explain a decision—contains argumentation.”21 
Metanormatively, legal argumentation should be rational or 
“cogent”; that is, it should consist of “premises . . . acceptable to the 
audience to whom it is addressed, relevant to its conclusion, and 
sufficient to warrant belief in its conclusion.”22 Legal argumentation 
is thus dialectical, in that it anticipates a verbal exchange where the 
parties subject their claims to critical assessment to “move from 
conjecture and opinion to more secure belief.”23 In this article, I refer 
to a ‘rational appeal’ as a dialectical argumentative move that 
contributes to the cogency of the argument of which it is a part.  
Lawyers, however, strive to win, so they are interested in 
constructing arguments that are persuasive. Legal argumentation is 
19 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1025. As used here, ‘topoi’ are 
merely categories of arguments appropriate in certain circumstances, a term 
that derives from classical rhetoric. Id. at 1005–06. 
20 Larson, supra note 1, at 668 (citations omitted). I consider the 
argumentation to include both the premises and the conclusion. 
21 Id. Some scholars distinguish the arguments of lawyers from the 
“justification” of judges. Id. n.21 (citing Schauer, supra note 1, at 571 n.2). As 
both satisfy my definition of “argumentation,” I cannot support the 
distinction. 
22 TRUDY GOVIER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARGUMENT 119 (1999). 
23 Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser, Strategic Maneuvering: A 
Synthetic Recapitulation, 20 ARGUMENTATION 381, 382–83 (2006) 
(“[D]ialectic is defined pragmatically as a method for dealing systematically 
with critical exchanges in verbal communication and interaction ‘that 
amounts to the pragmatic application of logic, a collaborative method of 
putting logic into use so as to move from conjecture and opinion to more 
secure belief.’”) I avoid the term ‘logical’ in terms of describing legal 
arguments and argumentative moves because of various senses in which that 
term is used. Larson, supra note 1, at 674–75. 
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in this sense rhetorical, in that advocates and judges seek 
argumentation with an eye toward its “potential effectiveness . . . in 
convincing or persuading an audience in actual argumentative 
practice.”24 Consequently, proponents of legal arguments often 
supplement rational appeals with what I will call ‘tactical appeals,’ 
argumentative moves that the proponent uses to make the argument 
more persuasive.25 This could include an argumentative move that 
might be termed ‘purely rhetorical,’ in that it does nothing to increase 
the cogency of the argument, but rational and tactical appeals are not 
mutually exclusive. Only when a tactical appeal leads the audience 
away from a cogent argument is it deceptive or fallacious.26 
This article is concerned principally with rational appeals but 
without derogation of tactical appeals, including applied legal 
storytelling and legal stylistics.27  
24 van Eeemeren & Houtlosser, supra note 23, at 383. 
25 This concept is adapted loosely from the argumentation-theoretic concept 
of strategic maneuvering. Id. (“Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts 
arguers make in argumentative discourse to reconcile aiming for rhetorical 
effectiveness with maintaining dialectical standards of reasonableness.”). 
“Strategic maneuvering manifests itself in argumentative discourse in the 
choices that are made from the ‘topical potential’ available at a certain stage 
in the discourse, in ‘audience-directed framing’ of the argumentative moves, 
and in the purposive use of ‘presentational devices.’” Id. The presentational 
devices of their definition come closest to my notion of the tactical appeal. 
See also VAN EEMEREN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY 552–
55 (2014).  
26 van Eeemeren & Houtlosser, supra note 23, at 387 (“[F]allacies are 
violations of [rational] critical discussion rules that come about as 
derailments of strategic maneuvering.”). 
27 See Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling and to 
This Symposium, 14 LEGAL WRITING 3, 3 (2008) (describing storytelling as 
“the backbone of the all-important theory of the case, which is the essence of 
all client-centered lawyering”); Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a 
Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J. 
ALWD 63, 64 (exploring the “concern that [legal storytelling] may be too 
powerful or, perhaps, inappropriately powerful”); Shaun B. Spencer & 
Adam Feldman, Words Count: The Empirical Relationship Between Brief 
Writing and Summary Judgment Success, 22 LEGAL WRITING 61, 61–62 
(2018) (“measur[ing] the statistical relationship between brief readability 
and case outcomes”); Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, Clearly, 
Using Intensifiers is Very Bad—Or Is It?, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 171, 173, 181 
(2008) (exploring use of intensifiers “very,” “obviously,” “clearly,” 
“patently,” “absolutely,” “really,” “plainly,” “undoubtedly,” “certainly,” 
“totally,” “simply,” and “wholly” and showing “excessive intensifier use in 
appellate briefs is associated with a statistically significant increase in 
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A rational appeal on any legal issue follows the generalization for 
practical argumentation that philosopher Stephen Toulmin 
identified: Practical rational arguments consist of data or facts and a 
“warrant” that justifies a move from those facts to some conclusion.28 
Reframed in terms of the law, a rational legal appeal requires a set of 
operative facts and a legal standard—a rule, principle, policy or the 
like—that calls for a certain outcome in the presence of those facts.29 
In principle, we could see this pattern as a deduction: 
Major premise: If operative facts, then normative consequence. 
Minor premise: Operative facts. 
Conclusion: Normative consequence.30 
Of course, requiring a deductive rule here oversimplifies legal 
reasoning in important ways, because an argument may not articulate 
a major premise in terms of a clear deductive rule; the warrant may 
be a policy such as the best interest of a child or a principle such as 
judicial efficiency; and the argument may articulate the major 
premise only in the outcomes of precedent cases where no clear rule 
emerges from them.31 
Toulmin’s insight was that practical argumentation is “field 
dependent”—that is, argumentation in different fields may have 
conclusions of different logical types, and “there are common 
standards applicable in [their] criticism . . . .”32 So an argument from 
any field, for example, that would support an assertion about who 
should “be a member of the U.S. Davis Cup team . . . or for adopting 
Fröhlich’s theory of super-conductivity . . . is . . . tested against its own 
appropriate standard.”33  
Deductive arguments, when they are available, are “field-
invariant”—they work in any field—because they are “analytical,” that 
is, the conclusion of the argument does not convey any new 
information.34 Consider this well-worn example:  
adverse outcomes for the ‘offending’ party, but in other situations . . . 
excessive intensifier use was associated with a significant increase in 
favorable appellate outcomes”). 
28 STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 90–91 (updated ed. 2003). 
29 See MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 24. 
30 Id. 
31 See generally Larson, supra note 1 (proposing defeasible argumentation 
schemes as a model for non-deductive argumentation in law). 
32 TOULMIN, supra note 28, at 15. 
33 Id. at 35. 
34 Id. at 116. 
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Major premise: All men are mortal. 
Minor premise: Socrates is a man. 
It is hardly necessary to utter the conclusion that Socrates is a mortal, 
because it provides no new information. The two premises necessitate 
that conclusion.  
There is no question that deductive reasoning is welcome among 
law judges and advocates. A legal rule is a premise in a deductive 
argument, like the major premise in a syllogism.35 For example: 
‘Under municipal ordinance, anyone who operates a vehicle in a 
municipal park is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ This states a rule in the 
form “[a]ccording to legal authority J, in every instance with features 
f1 . . . fn, legal category A applies,”36 or just “‘[w]henever OF [operative 
fact(s)] then NC [normative consequence],’”37 or ‘OFàNC.’ If the 
prosecutor combines this with the syllogism’s minor premise, the 
operative facts that the defendant did indeed operate a vehicle in a 
municipal park, then they may seem to compel the normative 
consequence that the defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
But law, like most human endeavors, permits non-deductive 
arguments. Consider this example: 
In a previous case before the highest court in this jurisdiction, 
the defendant was found liable under circumstances similar to 
this case; consequently, the defendant in this case will likely 
be liable. 
This seems like an entirely commonplace and acceptable argument in 
the law, though it is by no means deductively valid or sound. Would 
such an argument work in the science of epidemiology? How about 
this: 
Recently in this community, an eight-year-old child 
contracted the COVID-19 virus but did not develop significant 
symptoms; the child before me is eight years old and has 
contracted COVID-19 and consequently will likely not develop 
significant symptoms. 
35 Note that I only reluctantly refer to legal reasoning by deduction as a 
‘syllogism,’ for reasons I have explained elsewhere. Larson, supra note 1, at 
676 n.64. 
36 Id. at 698. 
37 Id. at 676 (quoting MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 24). 
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Even one not trained in science can recognize this is not an acceptable 
scientific argument. Two reasons present themselves for the differing 
acceptability for these arguments. On the practical-normative level, 
lawyers are likely to find the first example acceptable and scientists 
are not likely to accept the second; in short, field-dependent norms 
dictate whether the form of the argument is acceptable. On the 
metanormative level, the reason that the argument form is reasonable 
in law and not in science may be that law and science reach 
conclusions of different logical forms. In law, the conclusions are 
about what legal consequences will flow from operative facts; the 
court’s judgment on an issue is a declaration that brings that very 
state of affairs into being. When scientists offer an observation about 
a scientific fact, they are making an assertion about how the world is. 
A judge or lawyer’s argumentation about a legal issue generally 
consists in their assertions about what the law is, what the facts of the 
instant case are, and how the former apply to the latter. 
Conventionally, no U.S. judge should write an opinion to justify a 
decision, and no lawyer should write a brief to urge a particular 
outcome, without using previous court opinions, often just called 
‘cases,’ to support the argumentation in them. Of course, other 
authorities affect the arguments: Statutes and regulations may supply 
some or all the legal rules, and secondary sources may supply 
interpretive frameworks or arguments that lawyers and judges find 
compelling, or at least moderately persuasive. This particular study 
focuses only on the use of cases as authorities, however. 
This study gathers empirical evidence for one theory about how 
judges and advocates use cases—the legal topoi. 
A. Theory & Questions About Legal Topoi
Professor Hanns Hohmann, an argumentation theorist and 
scholar of communication and the law, considered how to adapt the 
classical stases of Greek and Roman rhetoric to contemporary legal 
argument.38 Hohmann argued that the rational arguments lawyers 
make in civil litigation fall into one or more of three “general 
dimensions of argument”—“operative, regulative, and optative.” 
Professor Susan Provenzano and I have argued that these dimensions 
are related to the classical stases in a slightly different way and that 
38 Hanns Hohmann, The Dynamics of Stasis: Classical Rhetorical Theory 
and Modern Legal Argumentation, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 171 (1989); see also 
Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 988–1001 (providing a treatment of 
classical stasis theory, applicable definitions and conventions, etc.). 
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Hohmann’s dimensions are akin to the classical topoi, categories of 
arguments applicable in certain circumstances.39  
Summarizing our perspective: A legal rule, standard, or 
principle—Toulmin’s warrant and similar to the major premise of the 
deduction—applied to legally relevant facts—Toulmin’s data and 
similar to the minor premise—resolves every legal issue. The topoi 
categorize the warrants and data that the law uses to resolve issues. 
We renamed them “empirical,” “conventional,” and “values-based” 
and defined them as follows: 
[The] empirical topos refers to arguments grounded in 
observations about the world, including observations about 
factual events and legal texts, and rational inferences about 
them. The conventional topos refers to arguments that 
employ legal standards to categorize or interpret facts or law 
in a certain manner. The values-based topos covers 
arguments that appeal to underlying legal norms or real-world 
consequences, but within the constraints that our legal system 
imposes on such policy-oriented and emotionally appealing 
arguments.40  
We proposed—“provisionally”—that normative appeals are more 
rationally compelling than conventional ones, and conventional more 
than values based.41 We did not provide a metanormative justification 
for this hierarchy, and our empirical evidence for it consisted of 
references to selected cases, not a systematic study. 
This study extends that work. Before the present study, I had 
intuitions about how lawyers and judges used cited cases in their 
39 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1005–06. 
40 Id. at 1025. This hierarchy is similar to the hierarchy that Professors 
MacCormick and Summers proposed for statutory interpretation in their 
collection of essays taking a comparative approach to that question. See D. 
Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in 
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 511, 512–14 (D. Neil 
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). In decreasing order of 
preference, “[l]inguistic arguments” are those based on the meanings of the 
actual words used in a statute; “systemic arguments” include arguments 
based on “contextual harmonization,” precedent, and analogy; and 
“teleological/evaluative arguments” include arguments about legislative 
purpose. Id. at 512–14; see also Eveline Feteris, Prototypical Argumentative 
Patterns in a Legal Context: The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the 
Justification of Judicial Decisions, 30 ARGUMENTATION 61, 63 (2016). 
41 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1025. 
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arguments, and I could point to artifacts where argument proponents 
did as I expected. Those intuitions are grounded in the cases that I 
have happened to read over the years and my felt sense of what is 
typical in them, not in a systematic collection and analysis of 
arguments. Based on this theory, if lawyers and judges share this 
metanorm as a practical norm, we would expect them to prefer to 
make more arguments using rules, fewer using case examples or legal 
analogies, and even fewer asserting policies. Before the present study, 
however, there were no data that showed the presence or magnitude 
of these differences or how those types of arguments work together. 
In fact, there were no data to support the claim that those are 
generally the only types of rational uses to which advocates and judges 
put case precedents. We also did not know the extent to which they 
cited cases for tactical appeals. 
Thus, at the root of the present study is the question, ‘How do 
lawyers and judges make use of cited cases to support their 
arguments?’ It’s also a really big question. Even narrowing it to 
explore this one theoretical problem leaves a pretty broad range of 
options for exploration. Consequently, I developed these research 
questions: 
Research Questions 
RQ1. To what uses did the judges and attorneys put 
citations to previous cases in their opinions and 
briefs in the artifacts selected for study here? 
RQ2. With what relative frequency did they use cases in 
these ways? 
That the answers to these questions matter is on some level 
obvious: The ways that judges and lawyers make and justify their 
arguments and decisions have profound impacts on all our lives. 
Understanding those practices in light of theories of reasoning and 
argumentation is thus critical for understanding this country’s laws 
and its society.  
There are practical and pedagogical implications as well. 
Understanding what counts as typical for legal arguments is 
practically important for lawyers making those arguments. If lawyers 
present their arguments in unexpected ways, they may be harder for 
the reader to comprehend, resulting in a failure of the communication 
and its argument.42 Understanding what counts as typical for legal 
42 See Brian N. Larson, Gender/Genre: The Lack of Gendered Register in 
Texts Requiring Genre Knowledge, 33 WRITTEN COMMUNICATION 360, 364 
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arguments is practically important for legal pedagogy as well. Legal 
textbooks and books on legal theory targeted at law students make 
assertions about how legal arguments do or should work, and those 
assertions should be consistent with what lawyers typically do, or they 
risk disadvantaging the students who believe in them. For example, 
Professor Fredrick Schauer’s Thinking Like a Lawyer purports 
“mostly . . . to introduce beginning and prospective law students to 
the nature of legal thinking.”43 Regarding the use of cited cases, 
however, he asserts that one either must use an explicitly stated rule 
from the case or infer from the case what that rule would be before 
applying it to the current legal problem.44 Some textbooks on legal 
analysis make similar claims.45 If these views are not consistent with 
an empirical assessment, we should not teach them to law students; if 
empirical data support them, so much the better. 
As Part I.B. shows, there have been no answers to these research 
questions from an empirical perspective. They remain unknown. 
B. Relevant Literature
My review of bibliometric, legal, and argumentation scholarship 
did not reveal satisfactory answers to the research questions. The 
scholarship in applied linguistics and writing studies suggested some 
(2016). “Genre knowledge comprises components of the communicator’s 
cognitive environment: her assumptions about communicative behaviors 
she expects to have a particular effect or effects on a reader based on 
knowledge about a typified situation in the writer’s cognitive environment.” 
Id. at 364. If the author of a legal brief, for example, varies from genre 
conventions, she imposes higher cognitive effort on her reader; the 
unexpected performance of the author is harder for the reader to 
comprehend. See id. at 362–65. 
43 FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING xi (2009). 
44 See generally id. ch. 3.  
45 See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOAN MALMUD ROCKLIN & SANDY PATRICK, 
A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 116 (3d ed. 2018) 
(counseling argument proponents to precede each use of a case as an 
example with a “hook” a statement “of the legal principle that the case 
illustration will clarify and prove to be true”); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & 
SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 53 (2008) (framing case analogies with the 
description of “determinative facts” that unite the cited and instant cases). 
But see MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND
ANALYSIS 145 (2d ed. 2015) (counseling argument proponents to use 
“explanatory synthesis”—statement of a principle synthesized from the 
example case(s) but allowing for merely case-by-case comparison of 
examples). 
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methodological perspectives but did not address legal argumentation. 
None of the existing research methods was adequate for answering 
these research questions 
Numerous theories in bibliometrics exist for why scholars cite 
other works.46 Studies exist, too, to explore how students cite works 
in school writing to introduce topics, support claims, and compare 
and contrast findings of cited works with each other and with 
students’ own projects, among other purposes.47 There are nods, too, 
to a rhetorical motivation in each kind of writing.48 Sociological and 
bibliometric theories of reference and citation explain them in 
functional, normative, and phenomenological terms.49 These 
perspectives do not provide insights to the questions in this study 
because they do not address the litigation context—where the 
arguments function for different purposes than those in academic 
papers. 
Within the legal scholarship, there is a rich theoretical discussion 
about legal analogy and legal deduction.50 Law scholars have written 
a great deal about legal reasoning, precedents, etc.51 But there is very 
46 Emanuela Riviera, Scientific Communities as Autopoietic Systems: The 
Reproductive Function of Citations, 64 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 
1442, 1450 (2013) (Citations “pay intellectual debts; . . . are considered as 
reward devices; they work as concept symbols, standing for shared 
knowledge; they work as codes and medium of communication.” (citations 
omitted)) 
47 See generally Lee-Ann Kastman Breuch & Brian N. Larson, Research and 
Rhetorical Purpose: Using Genre Analysis to Understand Source Use in 
Technical and Professional Writing, in POINTS OF DEPARTURE: RETHINKING
STUDENT SOURCE USE AND WRITING STUDIES RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE
STUDY OF STUDENT WRITING (Tricia Serviss & Sandra Jamieson eds., 2017). 
48 See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION 30–44 (1987) (describing the 
rhetorical functions of citations in the scientific article). 
49 Blaise Cronin, Metatheorizing Citation, 43 SCIENTOMETRICS 45, 46–48 
(1998). Functionalists explain citations as the citing author’s effort to 
“provide supplementary evidence, to support or refute an hypothesis, to 
furnish historical context.” Id. at 46. Normative theorists describe the social 
norms, including “dispensing of [rewards to cited authors] within the 
scholarly communication system . . . . [and] providing . . . socially 
appropriate cues and reinforcers.” Id. at 47. Phenomenologists explore how 
“social-psychological variables [shape] an author’s referencing behavior.” Id. 
The perspectives are not mutually exclusive. 
50 See generally Larson, supra note 1, and sources cited therein. 
51 See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 
(1949); RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS (3d ed. 1997); LARRY
ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING (2008). 
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little empirical work examining how lawyers and judges actually use 
cases in their arguments. The legal literature is replete, though, with 
citation-focused studies.52 Nearly all of it relies entirely on noting 
whether an opinion has cited an authority anywhere at all, or not—a 
scale that I will explain below is inadequate for this project. Like many 
efforts in the legal academy, such studies focus on pecking orders: the 
“most influential” law reviews, law-review articles, judges, courts, 
opinions, etc.53  
Some studies purport to focus more on how or why judges make 
choices about the authorities they cite. Professor John Merryman’s 
study was an early one, later updated.54 Merryman offered numerous 
52 For lengthy, though by no means exhaustive, summaries, see Dietrich 
Fausten, Ingrid Nielsen & Russell Smyth, A Century of Citation Practice on 
the Supreme Court of Victoria, 31 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 733, 734–36 
(2007); Kevin Bennardo & Alexa Z. Chew, Citation Stickiness, 20 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 67–75 (2019). Note that in many ways, the study of 
citational bibliometrics in law much pre-dates that in the broader academy. 
Fred R. Shapiro, Origins of Bibliometrics, Citation Indexing, and Citation 
Analysis: The Neglected Legal Literature, 43 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. 337, 
337 (1992). 
53 For example, Sirico and Margulies assessed the frequency with which the 
U.S. Supreme Court cited legal periodicals. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., & Jeffrey B. 
Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 131–32 (1986). Sirico followed up on this study 
later. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 
1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009 (2000). It is unclear whether the researchers 
there counted a one-to-one relationship between opinion and cited journal, 
where a journal article would count as one if it was cited anywhere in the 
opinion, one time or many; or a many-to-one relationship, where a journal 
article was counted as one each time an opinion cited it. The first study is 
silent on this question, Sirico & Margulies, supra at 132 n.3, while the latter 
seems to suggest the many-to-one approach, Sirico supra at 1010 n.9 (“For 
purposes of consistency, we counted a citation only when the citation 
included the name of the law journal. For example, we would not count an 
‘id.’”). For other pecking-order studies, see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited 
Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449 (1991) (identifying 
the most-cited articles from the first 100 years of the Yale Law Journal); 
William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial 
Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998) (using “the number of citations to the published 
opinions of judges on the federal courts of appeals to measure the influence 
of individual judges”). 
54 John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California 
Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954) [hereinafter 
Merryman, Authority]; John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of 
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proposals for why judges cite authorities: shoring up the institutional 
legitimacy of the court by providing certainty or predictability; to 
recognize the parties’ reliance on precedent; supporting the veil of 
impartiality over the law or the judge that precedent provides;55 
maintaining “the fiction of an abstract law which is mechanically 
applied by its instrument, the judge”; satisfying society’s expectations 
or demands “that the judge decide cases in the traditional judicial 
manner”;56 and satisfying natural drives “toward certainty and 
simplicity” with “law [that] appears to be stable, certain and 
ascertainable through consultation of the appropriate writings 
(authority).”57 He claimed that citations to authorities advanced 
efficiency objectives.58 Finally, he argued that judges have a habit or 
natural propensity to cite.59 His evidence for this, however, was only 
the frequency with which the California Supreme Court and 
individual judges on it cited various authorities.60 It is difficult to see 
how he could draw these conclusions from those data. 
Other studies are interesting because they have used citation 
counts to argue about (a) whether courts use cited cases to decide the 
law rationally or as window-dressing to legitimize their decisions,61 
Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California 
Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1978) 
[hereinafter Merryman, Theory].  
55 Merryman, Authority, supra note 54, at 613–22. 
56 Id. at 625. 
57 Id. at 626. 
58 Id. at 622 (satisfying the parties’ reliance on precedent); id. at 624 
(reviewing prior decisions for possible solutions to the instant case rather 
than reinventing the wheel); id. (valuing the “accumulated wisdom and 
experience” of the previous judges); id. (“disposing of legal problems with 
relative finality, rather than allowing them to be relitigated to no purpose”); 
id. (simplifying the judge’s argument, “letting [the judge] dispose of the 
problem on the basis of conclusions reached in earlier decisions”). 
59 Id. at 625 (transferring “some of the responsibility for [the judge’s] 
decision to other shoulders than [the judge’s] own”); id. (recognizing the 
“inertia” of the judicial process); id. (the influence of habit and training on 
lawyers and judges); id. (satisfaction of the urge “toward symmetry, toward 
system-building”); id. at 626 (a natural tendency to “[r]espect . . . the 
opinions of those who have gone before, especially the dead ones”); id. 
(satisfying natural drives “toward certainty and simplicity” with “law [that] 
appears to be stable, certain and ascertainable through consultation of the 
appropriate writings (authority)”). 
60 Id. at 650–72; see also Merryman, Theory, supra note 54 (replete with 
tables of tallies throughout). 
61 Frank B. Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R. Johnson & Paul J. 
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(b) how judges use scientific and social scientific research in
opinions,62 and (c) whether judges cite the same cases that parties’
briefs do.63
All these studies attempted to answer their research questions by 
counting associations between cited authorities and citing artifacts—
court opinions or advocates’ briefs.64 In other words, if an artifact cites 
an authority anywhere, one time or a dozen, to support one point or a 
dozen, it still just counts as one citation. Some of the scholars noted 
the limitations of this approach, acknowledging that actually 
examining the content of the opinions could answer more of their 
questions.65 
Some studies of legal argumentation in the law do look at more 
granular data. For example, Professor Nina Varsava has explored the 
stylistic practices of Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch in opinions 
before their appointments to the Supreme Court.66 Professors Lance 
Long and William Christensen explored whether the use of 
intensifiers, such as “clearly” and “obviously,” correlated with the 
Wahlbeck, Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their 
Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489. They concluded that the 
answer is not black and white. Id. at 573. 
62 In 1990, Acker considered the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court used 
“social science research evidence” in its opinions, and the extent to which the 
Court found those citations in briefs of the parties or amici or on the Court’s 
own initiative. James R. Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal 
Cases and Briefs: The Actual and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists 
as Amici Curiae, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 28 (1990).  
63 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 52.  
64 Cross et al., supra note 61, at 522–25, is interesting in that it also used 
network analysis, a means of identifying cases that are more “central” in their 
tendency to be cited, but still based on citation counting. Citation studies in 
the law also include those where the researcher assesses the impact of a 
patent by the frequency with which it is cited in later patents. See generally 
Jonathan H. Ashtor, Does Patented Information Promote the Progress of 
Technology?, 113 NW. U. L. REV 943 (2019). 
65 E.g., Merryman, Theory, supra note 54, at 384; Bennardo & Chew, supra 
note 52, at 107 n.133.  
66 See generally Nina Varsava, Elements of Judicial Style: A Quantitative 
Guide to Neil Gorsuch’s Opinion Writing, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. ONLINE FEATURE 
75 (2018), https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/NYU-Law-Review-Volume-93-Varsava.pdf; 
Nina Varsava, Computational Legal Studies, Digital Humanities, and 
Textual Analysis, in COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE PROMISE AND
CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN LEGAL RESEARCH ___ (Ryan Whalen ed., 2020), 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3307084.  
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success of appellate briefs67 and whether an author “faced with an 
argument that a legal writer believes—or knows—she is likely to lose, 
the writer will tend to write in a style that uses more intensifiers.”68 
This focus on stylistic matters, however, addresses the tactical appeals 
that I described above and does not address the rational appeals in 
legal arguments. 
Argumentation theory similarly has a rich tradition theoretically 
addressing the use of cited cases or precedents in legal 
argumentation.69 The studies of actual court opinions there, however, 
tend to involve close reading of a very small number of opinions.70 I 
hope, however, to answer the descriptive question—How do authors 
use cited cases in their arguments?—generally at some scale. 
Outside the law and argumentation theory, there is work in the 
field of writing studies and applied linguistics, particularly in the area 
of genre theory, that accounts for the use of cited authorities. For 
example, applied linguist John Swales analyzed scholarly research 
articles to identify their genre characteristics.71 He segmented the 
67 Long & Christensen, supra note 27, at 181. 
68 Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, When Justices (Subconsciously) 
Attack: The Theory of Argumentative Threat and the Supreme Court, 91 OR. 
L. REV. 933, 938 (2013).
69 E.g., ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 274–79 (Ruth
Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 1989); MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 143–
61; C.H. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE
ON ARGUMENTATION 351–57 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969)
(treating argument from precedent as argument by example). See generally
Kevin D. Ashley, Precedent and Legal Analogy, in HANDBOOK OF LEGAL
REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION (Giorgio Bongiovanni et al. eds., 2018).
70 For example, Feteris analyzed a single U.S. Supreme Court case. Feteris,
supra note 40, at 70–77. Plug looked for linguistic cues in a small number of
court opinions to characterize their role in marking text as dictum. José Plug,
Indicators of Obiter Dicta: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of Textual Clues
for the Reconstruction of Legal Argumentation, 8 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
& L. 189, 192–202 (2000). And Kloosterhuis looked at three court opinions
for evidence of certain argumentation schemes. Harm Kloosterhuis,
Reconstructing Complex Analogy Argumentation in Judicial Decisions: A
Pragma-Dialectical Perspective, 19 ARGUMENTATION 471, 475–82 (2005).
71 A genre is “a class of communicative events, the members of which share
some set of communicative purposes.” JOHN M. SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS: 
ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH SETTINGS 58 (1990); see also Larson,
supra note 42. In the law, there are numerous genres, such as the demand
letter, complaint, trial motion and brief, appellate brief, etc. See generally
ALEXA Z. CHEW & KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL, THE COMPLETE LEGAL WRITER
(2016). These are textual artifacts that have common forms because they
address common purposes. See id. at 4 (defining “genre” as “a recurring
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articles into typical sections, like introduction, methods, results, and 
discussion.72 Within the sections, he analyzed certain rhetorical 
“moves.” A move “in genre analysis is a discoursal or rhetorical unit 
that performs a coherent communicative function in . . . discourse.”73 
This might be a group of sentences, a sentence, or even a clause.74 
Swales considered the structure of discussion sections in research 
articles and the moves there, including background information, 
statement of results, and references to previous research.75 The last of 
these, reference to previous research, is most like citing cases in a legal 
text, and Swales asserted that authors use them “for purposes of 
comparison with present research and . . . for purposes of providing 
support for present research.”76 Others have extended this work in the 
field of technical communication, studying the ways that students 
made use of cited sources to situate their own work in technical-report 
writing.77 Neither of these genre-theoretic approaches subjected legal 
communication to analysis.78 
Counting citations does not supply an adequate method for 
document type that has certain predictable conventions” and “conventions” 
as “parts of a genre and the ways that audiences expect a genre to be 
written”). 
72 SWALES, supra note 71, at 137–76. 
73 JOHN M. SWALES, RESEARCH GENRES: EXPLORATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 228 
(2004). 
74 SWALES, supra note 73, at 229. For example, in the introduction to a 
research article, an author typically establishes the territory of the article 
(Move 1), establishes its niche (Move 2), and then occupies the niche (Move 
3). SWALES, supra note 71, at 140–43. Moves are then further subdivided into 
steps. See, e.g., id. at 142–47. This is a functionalist approach akin to that 
described for citations above. See supra note 49. The approach from this 
study will be functionalist in similar ways. 
75 SWALES, supra note 71, at 172–73.  
76 SWALES, supra note 71, at 173. 
77 See generally Breuch & Larson, supra note 47. They analyzed artifacts at 
the atomistic or sentence level, eschewing the more flexible move, which 
could be longer or shorter than a sentence. Id. at 186. They found that 
students used references to previous research much as Swales had suggested, 
but that a common purpose for that move was also to introduce a new topic 
or new material, something Swales had not identified. Id. at 193. 
78 Bhatia did so in a book chapter in which he analyzed the common-law 
“legal case” of Roles v. Nathan [1963] 2 All ER 908. VIJAY K. BHATIA, 
ANALYSING GENRE: LANGUAGE USE IN PROFESSIONAL SETTINGS 129–35 (1993). 
Though he examined the text carefully, it was still only one court case, not 
enough to generalize even about opinions by the same author, let alone legal 
arguments generally. 
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assessing how, functionally, authors use citations to previous 
opinions in their legal argumentation. Thus, answering the research 
questions identified above will not benefit from merely identifying 
those court opinions that a legal argument cites. Cases may also be 
used in diverse ways in distinct parts of an artifact. An extended 
example may help bring the categories alive and show concretely how 
they can overlap. Consider, Hosseinzadeh v. Klein,79 artifact 17.03.00 
in this study, where the court analyzed fair use. While discussing the 
first fair-use factor, the court cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc.80 
“The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether 
the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original 
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 
114 S.Ct. 1164.81 
Here, we can read the use of Campbell as an effort to offer authority 
for the rule or policy statement contained in the quoted passage. The 
citation is, of course, also necessary to explain the use of the quotation 
marks. But the same opinion cites Campbell again, in the section 
discussing the fourth fair-use factor: 
The question is whether the allegedly infringing work serves 
as a “market substitute” for the allegedly infringed work, not 
merely whether the market for the allegedly infringed work 
was harmed. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (noting 
that critical parodies may legitimately aim at harming the 
market for a copyrighted work, and that “a lethal parody, like 
a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original [but] 
does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright 
Act.”).82 
Here, it seems that the Hosseinzadeh court cites Campbell in support 
of its assertion of two other rules: One regarding the extent to which 
the court must consider market harm, and the other (in the 
explanatory parenthetical) the rule that the harm a parody does to the 
79 276 F. Supp. 3d 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
80 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
81 276 F. Supp. 3d at 41–42 (citation omitted). 
82 Id. at 43. 
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market of its original is not cognizable under the Copyright Act. A few 
lines later, the court continues: “Accordingly, ‘the role of the courts is 
to distinguish between biting criticism that merely suppresses 
demand and copyright infringement, which usurps it.’ Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 592, 114 S.Ct. 1164.” This seems to support the previous rule 
about parodies and market effects.  
But how should we characterize the function(s) of Campbell in 
this opinion? Hosseinzadeh cites one case; it uses that case to prove 
three legal rules and to support three quotations from the cited case; 
the rule and quotation functions co-occur, with two citations together 
supporting one rule and two supporting one rule each. 
For the present study, therefore, I concluded that I would need to 
segment textual artifacts in some fashion to determine how the cited 
cases function in different parts of the instant argument, and I would 
need to determine some means for counting what phenomena are 
present. Analysis on the sentence-by-sentence level—or word-by-
word, as some of the stylistic studies have done—was likely to produce 
too many units of analysis, particularly because many sentences in an 
artifact—opinion or brief—do not refer to cases at all.83 Looking for 
Swalesian moves or steps would have been problematic in part 
because it is difficult to define move or step boundaries.84 I describe 
the solution to that problem and the methods I used for coding the 
resulting argument segments in Part II. 
II. Materials & Methods
It would be impossible to examine how all judges and advocates 
have used cases in all situations. Consequently, I selected a narrower 
set of materials. Part II.A. explains which artifacts I chose to study 
and why. I had to develop new methods to analyze these artifacts, 
because as Part I.B. showed, the methods of previous studies were not 
sufficient to answer my research questions. The methods I employed 
were first to segment the arguments to analyze, a process described in 
Part II.B., and then to assign coding categories to the case uses, a 
process described in Part II.C. Readers not interested in 
methodological details about this study may wish to jump to Part III 
for the findings of the study and proceed to Part IV for interpretations 
of them. 
83 See supra note 77 (discussing a study using sentence-by-sentence or 
atomistic coding).  
84 Breuch and Larson noted the challenges for reliability of defining text 
segments for analysis. Breuch & Larson, supra note 47, at 188.  
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A. Data Selection & Collection
This section describes the strategy for selecting and method for 
collecting data for this study and the resulting corpus. I chose just one 
area of law because I suspect there are genre-theoretic85 concerns 
about mixing case types. Each body of law may represent its own 
genre(s) in legal briefs and opinions. Consequently, lawyers arguing 
about family, criminal, contract, and other bodies of law may employ 
different practices to make their points. Variations across such genres 
might function as noise in analyzing any particular practice across 
them. Better would be to study one subject-matter area and then 
sample across other types of case to see whether patterns observed 
here are present there. I chose copyright fair use, mostly because it is 
interesting to me. 
Fair use is a doctrine under copyright law that permits a 
secondary user of a copyright-protected work to make use of it in a 
way that would otherwise be copyright infringement.86 It is an 
affirmative defense that defeats the rights holder’s infringement 
claim.87 It requires a balancing of four factors on a case-by-case basis: 
(1) the purpose and character of the [secondary] use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 88
Fair use, and copyright generally, is also exclusively subject to the 
jurisdiction of federal courts.89 The choice of fair use raises some 
85 See supra notes 42, 71 and accompanying text. 
86 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
87 Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (“This 
affirmative defense presumes that unauthorized copying has occurred, and 
is instead aimed at whether the defendant’s use was fair.”). 
88 17 U.S.C. § 107. Courts balance the factors on a case-by-case basis. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is 
not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it 
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”). 
89 28 U.S.C. § 1338. But see T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 824 (2d 
Cir. 1964) (noting that an action where “the purported sole owner of a 
copyright alleged that persons claiming partial ownership had recorded their 
claim in the Copyright Office and had warned his licensees against 
disregarding their interests was not one ‘arising under any Act of Congress 
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questions or limitations relating to this study.90 Though I address 
some of them in the findings and discussion below, only further 
research will resolve the others. I chose district courts as the source 
for these artifacts because in the federal hierarchy, trial courts provide 
more access to the day-to-day work of lawyers and judges.91 In 
practice, what this means is that there is far more legal reasoning and 
argumentation at the trial-court level simply because there are more 
cases adjudicated there, and each case may require many stopping 
points or stases where the parties and the judges consider legal 
arguments.92 Appellate courts, on the other hand, hear fewer cases, 
and it is possible that the kinds of arguments there will be different 
because of the different role of these courts in our system.93 If we are 
exploring practical norms relating to the use of cases in arguments, 
we should consider those places where most of the arguments are 
happening. 
relating to . . . copyrights’”).  
90 One concern with copyright opinions is that they are not proportionally 
distributed across all trial courts at the federal level. In this sample, 137 of 
the artifacts, or 68.8%, were from district courts in the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, which tend to have fuller copyright dockets because of the 
concentration of entertainment and publishing businesses in New York and 
California. The best I can do with this concern is to note it and suggest that 
future studies should look at different slices of lawyers’ practices, or at 
different communities or sub-communities in the genre-theoretic senses. See 
supra notes 42, 71. See the findings in Part III comparing artifacts from cases 
in the Southern District of New York and other courts. Part III.A.5. Second, 
given fair use’s factor-based nature, the relative frequency of the category 
called EXAMPLE below might be expected to be higher here than in artifacts 
relating to other bodies of law. The remedy is to conduct further studies in 
other areas of the law.  
91 See U.S. Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2018, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-
statistics-2018 (last visited Nov. 15, 2019) (noting that in 2018, civil filings 
in regional courts of appeal totaled 49,363; in the Federal Circuit, 1617; in 
district courts, 358,563); Supreme Court of the United States, Granted & 
Noted List: October Term 2018 Cases for Argument,, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/grantednotedlist/18grantednotedlist 
(identifying fewer than eighty cases that received grants of certiorari in that 
term). 
92 Provenzano & Larson, supra note 5, at 1019. While each appellate filing 
usually results in one round of lawyers’ briefs and a single opinion, a filing in 
district court may result in many rounds of briefs and opinions from the 
court. 
93 Nevertheless, I do recommend in the conclusion to this article that 
researchers should apply these methods to appellate legal arguments. 
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The data for this study were 199 artifacts, consisting of portions of 
fifty-five court opinions and 144 of the parties’ briefs that led to them. 
The opinions in question are reported opinions of federal district 
courts resolving dispositive motions relating to copyright fair use.94 I 
selected reported opinions randomly from the period January 1, 2012, 
through December 31, 2018, from those coded in Westlaw’s key 
numbering system with key 99, section 53.2, “Fair use and other 
permitted uses in general.”95  For each opinion, I checked the docket 
and the opinion itself to identify which motion papers were related to 
it. Many opinions resolved more than one motion implicating fair use, 
as, for example, when the parties cross-moved for summary judgment 
on that question.96 In each instance, I pulled the non-moving party’s 
opposition memo but did not pull further reply briefs.97 I believed it 
was important to have a round (or two turns) of argument where 
possible on the fair-use issues. If a moving party used a court’s 
opinion in its brief in support of a motion (or in support of its fair-use 
defense), it might be important to see whether and how the non-
moving party used the same opinion in its argument. For purposes of 
coding here, the artifacts consisted only of the portions of the briefs 
that addressed fair use.98 I downloaded the opinions from Westlaw 
94 For my purposes, ‘dispositive motion’ here includes post-trial briefs.  
95 I intentionally designed this study to avoid the need for human 
participants: The research materials and data are all available publicly online 
and thus require no intervention or interaction with the authors or litigants 
and no access to private information. I therefore did not need to seek review 
of this project by my institution’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
96 For example, in Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Center for Bio-
Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (No. SACV 11–
731 JVS) (artifact 12.03.00 in this study), the parties raised fair use in their 
cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants’ Memorandum of Points 
& Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 10 (Apr. 16, 
2012), ECF No. 40 (artifact 12.03.40 in this study) (raising fair-use defense); 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment at 9 (Apr. 16, 2013), ECF No. 45 (artifact 
12.03.45 in this study) (arguing that defendant could not succeed on fair use) 
97 There is a narrow band of exceptions to this statement: Where the 
copyright owner brought a claim for infringement and then moved for 
summary judgment, it occasionally omitted any reference to fair use, 
probably because it is an affirmative defense. If the copyright-claim 
defendant then raised fair use in its opposition memorandum, the claim 
plaintiff would address fair use in a reply brief. In this study, we would code 
the first brief raising fair use and the first brief from the other side 
responding to it.  
98 My RAs and I read the entire briefs. See Larson, supra note 12 (describing 
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and the applicable briefs from Bloomberg Law. I followed the 
procedures in the coding guide.99 
For each artifact, I recorded the forum court; the procedural 
posture of the case; the identity of the brief’s author and, in the case 
of a law-firm author, the approximate size of the firm;100 whether the 
artifact was a judge’s opinion, a rights holder’s brief, or a secondary 
user’s brief;101 whether the rights holder or secondary user prevailed 
the process for selecting the coding span). 
99 See Larson, supra note 12. Some of the artifacts in the data repository are 
subject to U.S. Copyright law, which vests in authors of texts like the briefs 
here the exclusive right to make copies of them. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). The 
opinions of the federal judges in this study are not, however, subject to 
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 105. Providing copies of working documents 
relating to opinions in the data repository thus creates no copyright liability. 
As for the lawyers’ briefs, even wholesale copying and distribution of lawyers’ 
briefs by commercial services Westlaw and Lexis has been held to be fair use 
under the Copyright Act. White v. West Pub. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396, 400 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). I contend that providing these copies in association with 
this study is a fair use. 
100 One to ten lawyers, eleven to fifty lawyers, fifty-one to 200 lawyers, and 
more than 200 lawyers. I considered the possibility that some readers might 
assume that practices they consider sub-optimal might be coming from sub-
optimal practitioners. I gathered firm-size information to be able to assess 
whether large firms (with firm size being in some people’s minds directly 
related to quality of lawyers) engaged in different practices than smaller 
ones. 
101 Regarding copyright fair use, I use the terms ‘secondary user’ and ‘rights 
holder’ in this way: A rights holder is a party in copyright litigation that owns 
a copyright that another party to the litigation may have infringed. A rights 
holder is often the plaintiff in a copyright action, though that is not 
necessary, as for example when the rights holder is the defendant in a 
declaratory judgment action. See, e.g., Richards v. Merriam-Webster, Inc., 
55 F. Supp. 3d 205, 210 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding there was no fair use where 
the plaintiff was a pro se secondary user seeking a declaration that his 
proposed use of portions of defendant/rights holder’s dictionary would be 
fair use). I used this term instead of ‘plaintiff,’ ‘defendant,’ ‘moving party,’ or 
‘non-moving party’ when describing a case for coding. A secondary user 
copies (or is alleged to have copied) at least a portion of the work of the rights 
holder and asserts that any such copying is protected under the fair-use 
doctrine. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“The traditional fair use analysis . . . [adjusts] the competing interests 
of authors—the author of the original copyrighted work and the author of the 
secondary work that ‘copies’ a portion of the original work . . . .”) (emphasis 
mine). See also id. at 920 (referring to “secondary user”). The secondary user 
is often the defendant in a copyright case, but it may be the plaintiff if it has 
brought a declaratory judgment action against the rights holder. 
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in the opinion;102 whether each brief was in support of a motion 
(usually for summary judgment or to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim), in opposition to it, both, or neither;103 and whether the client 
of the brief’s author was the prevailing or non-prevailing party on the 
fair-use issues discussed in it. The Appendix describes the resulting 
corpus and data. 
B. Segmenting Legal Arguments
As I noted in Part I.B., I needed to segment the argument texts 
analyzed here to determine how judges and advocates cited cases in 
different parts of an artifact. To address this issue, I used an idealized 
hierarchical text-segmentation strategy suggested by rhetorical 
structure theory (RST), with each proposition that constitutes a 
claim, called a “nucleus,” supported by other propositions, called 
“satellites.”104 RST idealizes the textual argument as having a main 
claim (sometimes also called a conclusion or standpoint) and sees all 
the parts of the text as falling into collectively exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive subsidiary arguments. A statement that receives support is 
a nucleus, in RST-theoretic terms, and each statement that supports 
it is a satellite. One can think of it as a form of outline or tree view of 
an argument, with each level consisting of discrete sub-arguments 
supporting the conclusion immediately above it.105 Legal opinions and 
briefs are well suited to hierarchical textual analysis because 
canonical perspectives in law-school teaching recommend 
102 It was possible that each had a partial victory. 
103 Practically speaking, judges’ opinions were the only artifacts in the neither 
category. Briefs could obviously be in support or opposition to a motion, but 
sometimes a brief functioned in both ways.  
104 See generally William C. Mann & Sandra A. Thompson, Rhetorical 
Structure Theory: Toward a Functional Theory of Text Organization, 8 
TEXT–INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE 243 (1988); 
Maite Taboada & William C. Mann, Applications of Rhetorical Structure 
Theory, 8 DISCOURSE STUDIES 567 (2006); Maite Taboada & William C. 
Mann, Rhetorical Structure Theory: Looking Back and Moving Ahead, 8 
DISCOURSE STUDIES 423 (2006); Marie-Francine Moens & Rik De Busser, 
First Steps in Building a Model for the Retrieval of Court Decisions, 57 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES 429 (2002); C. Reed 
& A. Daskalopolu, Modelling Contractual Arguments, 4TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION, pp. 686–92, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
(1998).  
105 I have not adopted the full RST framework, as I am interested only in the 
uses of cases as support. RST is much more thorough and operates a much 
smaller scale than I need to (or want to, given the effort involved). 
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hierarchical structure in legal writing.106 
I identified coding spans, the sections of each argument we would 
analyze closely.107 Second, we recorded the number of words and the 
raw number of citations to court opinions in the coding span.108 I refer 
to these as ‘raw citations’ in the findings below.109 Third, we broke the 
text below each nucleus or claim down into satellites or subpoints in 
support of that nucleus. We continued by treating each satellite or 
supporting claim as a nucleus or principal claim that was in turn 
supported by other satellites.110 The lowest level of satellite (that is, 
the satellite that is not also the nucleus for segments of arguments 
below it) is the point at which the text identifies some legal rule, 
principle, policy, or label and then shows how the facts in the instant 
case relate to it, without recourse to analysis of some subpoint within 
it. This might be the lowest application of what legal-writing teachers 
call “CREAC,” “IRAC,” or some other acronym that indicates the 
structure of giving a legal rule, principle, or standard, explaining it, 
sometimes with case examples, and applying it to facts in the instant 
106 See, e.g., RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 125–
30 (2008); DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: 
LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING 106–08 (3d ed. 2007); LAUREL
CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 134–37 (4th 
ed. 2006); see generally RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., Combining Proofs of 
Separate Conclusions of Law, in LEGAL REASONING & LEGAL WRITING 131 
(6th ed. 2009). 
107 See Larson, supra note 12 (more completely describing the process for 
text segmentation). This was the text segment that contained the top-level 
nucleus or claim—usually that a party’s motion for dismissal, summary 
judgment, new trial, etc.—on the issue of whether there was fair use. In short, 
they identified the segment(s) of the brief or court opinion that addressed 
fair use. 
108 Every citation to any court case in the coding span counted, including 
short forms and “id.” 
109 Note that raw citations did not include what I call “secondary citations”; 
these are citations within another citation that explain that the cited source 
was citing or quoting another source or that provide subsequent or prior 
history for the cited source. See Larson, supra note 12. This choice does not 
reflect any particular theoretical stance. Rather, for the sake of reliability in 
coding, it is a choice that must be made, and having been made, it should be 
expressed.  
110 At each level, coders highlighted the statement of the nucleus/claim, and 
in those cases where the nucleus was not clearly stated, the coders inserted 
bracketed language that did that work and highlighted the bracketed 
language. 
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case to reach a conclusion.111  That might involve application of a legal 
label, such as ‘the secondary user’s use is a parody’; or assessment of 
a legal factor or subfactor, such as ‘the secondary works are not 
transformative’ or ‘the secondary user’s commercial use does not 
support a finding of fair use.’ As a consequence of these efforts, it was 
possible in each case to extract a tree or outline of statements that the 
brief supports with arguments.112 
These efforts resulted in a division of the 199 artifacts in the study 
into 1810 distinct argument segments, 459 of them in the opinion 
artifacts and 1351 of them in the brief artifacts.  
After segmenting the arguments in the coding spans, we identified 
the first citation to each case in each argument segment. The result 
was a coding unit that I call a ‘case use.’ A case use is a correspondence 
between one segment of an artifact’s argument and a single cited case 
and encodes the argumentative purpose(s) of citing that case in 
support of the argument in that section. An argument segment may 
cite the case more than once, but there is only one case use per 
segment per case cited.113 
C. Coding Categories
Given that I divided the artifacts in this study’s corpus into 
argument segments and that each case cited in an argument segment 
represents a case use, I needed to decide what categories to assign to 
these case uses. During a pilot study described in subpart 1, it became 
evident that judges and advocates were using cases for a relatively 
small number of purposes, and that they could use each case for more 
than one purpose in a single argument segment. The pilot study 
provided a tentative answer to Research Question 1, which asked to 
what purposes the judges and attorneys put citations to previous cases 
in their arguments.114 I concluded that judges and advocates use cases 
to support assertions about legal rules, provide examples of 
application of legal rules, assert policy justifications for outcomes, 
generalize about prior cases, and support quotations from cited cases; 
I observed few other common uses. I formalized the results of the pilot 
study in the coding categories described in subsection 2, which I used 
for the broader study.  
111 See, e.g., CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOAN MALMUD ROCKLIN & SANDY PATRICK, 
A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 93–95 (3d ed. 
2018).  
112 Consider the reconstruction of the argument in the text in Part III of the 
Coding Guide. Larson, supra note 12. 
113 For an extended example, refer to Part III of Larson, supra note 12. 
114 See supra Part I.A. 
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1. Pilot Study (answering Research
Question 1) 
I worked to develop a typology for the uses that authors of court 
opinions and legal briefs made of the opinions that they cited. I 
worked with a research assistant, and we began simply by reading 
dozens of opinions and briefs and asking ourselves, ‘What’s going on 
here?’ ‘What is this author trying to achieve by citing this opinion?’ 
We started with detailed descriptions of what we saw, we discussed 
them with each other, and gradually, we settled on categories into 
which these uses normally fell.  
We immediately saw that an argument section within an artifact 
might use a single cited opinion in multiple ways. This is consistent 
with previous studies.115 But we could have called most of the uses we 
saw rational appeals.116 The authors might make them in the following 
ways: First, the author might assert the existence of a legal rule before 
applying that rule to the instant case. Citation to a prior opinion would 
support the claim that the rule exists in the form the author asserted. 
Second, the author might assert that courts in previous cases have 
generally taken a particular approach. This is akin to asserting a rule, 
but somewhat less of a commitment to its universal nature; it suggests 
a rule of probability or rule of thumb without asserting it universally. 
Third, the author might describe a previous case, including facts 
about it and its outcome, to permit the author then to argue that the 
instant case should come out the same (opposite) way because the 
cases were (dis)similar. Fourth, the author might cite a prior opinion 
to assert that a policy goal or consideration supports a particular 
outcome.  
The four rational uses of cases that the pilot study identified 
correspond to the topoi described above. First, authors who cite a case 
for a legal rule are using an empirical topos, often quoting an opinion 
when asserting what a rule of law is. Citation to a prior opinion 
supports the claim that the rule exists in the form the authors assert. 
Second, the use of a case example, where the author describes a 
previous case, including facts about it and its outcome, then argues 
that the instant case should come out the same (opposite) way 
because the cases were (dis)similar, is a conventional topos.117 Though 
that approach is common in legal reasoning, it does not compel a 
115 See, e.g., Breuch & Larson, supra note 47, at 191. 
116 See text accompanying note 23, supra. 
117 Reasoning by legal analogy is a key component of legal reasoning 
generally. For a fuller discussion, see generally Larson, supra note 1, and 
sources cited there, including particularly those at 664–65 nn.2–3. 
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conclusion to the same extent that the first does. Third, the author 
uses a values-based topos when citing a prior opinion to assert that a 
policy goal or consideration supports a particular outcome. Though 
this is still a rational appeal, courts are reluctant to apply policies 
directly to facts, as that places them in the role of legislatures; the 
possible exception is policies arising in and from the rules of court 
themselves, where judges have broader discretion. A fourth category 
of case use, asserting that courts in previous cases have generally 
taken a particular approach, did not fit easily into the three legal topoi, 
but it was common enough to warrant its own category here. Such a 
rule of probability or rule of thumb requires an inferential step from 
‘several have been decided in a certain way’ to ‘this case should be 
decided the same way.’ It is thus something like an empirical 
argument, but the number of cases cited to make a generalization was 
sometimes as small as one, and that does not satisfy any commonly 
accepted form of inductive reasoning; consequently, such 
generalizations seem to be conventional (or field-dependent) in the 
law. 
This exhausts the list of commonly observed rational appeals. 
Conventionally, an author should support any quotation from a 
case with a citation to that case. The status of a case quotation under 
the legal-topoi model is complex. These case uses often had rational 
functions, as every quotation qualifies as a de facto empirical 
argument about what some legal text says. It may nevertheless 
require conventional or values-based arguments to determine what 
the legal text means. Supporting rational arguments, however, was 
apparently not the only purpose for which authors quoted opinions. 
Authors often used quotations in ways that seemed less designed to 
appeal to the reader’s reason and more to the reader’s emotion or 
sense that the writer was speaking authoritatively—in short, tactical 
appeals.118 We also identified some case uses that either did not fit into 
the categories above or that appeared to be doing something specific 
in addition to those typical uses. Consider the parting quote/cite and 
stitched application/quote, fairly common practices discussed 
below.119 
2. Coding Categories & Process Used in
this Study 
Based on the pilot study, I developed the following approach to 
coding the case uses. Again, recall that ‘coding’ here refers to the 
118 See text accompanying note 25, supra. 
119 See infra Part III.B. 
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process of assigning category codes as described here, not to writing 
computer code. Note that references in this section to artifacts in this 
study transition to being references to documents and coding units 
according to the numbering scheme in the coding guide rather than 
to typical case and case-document citations. Thus ‘14.01.00’ is the 
court’s opinion in case 14.01, and ‘14.01.10’ refers to a brief in the case 
14.01 with the PACER/ECF identification number 10. References to 
case uses within an artifact use the ‘CU’ abbreviation—for ‘case use’ 
(or ‘coding unit’). So ‘14.01.00 CU01’ refers to the first case use in the 
opinion 14.01.00.120 The coding guide further describes and illustrates 
the coding categories themselves.121  
Two coders coded each artifact.122 Coders reviewed an entire 
argument section in which a coding unit appeared because the case 
cited in the coding unit may have been cited elsewhere in the same 
argument section. Coders coded the case use for all the uses made 
within the same argument section. They indicated which, if any, of 
five identified uses the author was making of a case in each portion of 
120 All the data are available in the data repository, an online supplement. 
Larson, supra note 12. 
121 Larson, supra note 12. 
122 I was one of the two coders on each of 169 (84.9%) of the artifacts. Because 
I recognize that different readers can perceive a case use as functioning in 
different ways, we took a greedy approach to codes: If one coder saw 
something the other did not, they resolved the difference in a conference, 
accepting the code if both coders thought it was at least plausible. A stingy 
approach, where a unit receives a code only if both coders saw it 
independently, is also justifiable but represents a conceptually different 
emphasis. We might interpret greedy coding as identifying plausible uses of 
opinions and stingy coding as identifying predominant uses of opinions. 
Because of this strategy, I was not particularly concerned about assessing 
inter-rater reliability. Nevertheless, I summarize IRR checks here: Mean 
pairwise, per-case-file observed agreement among coders was 86.9%. The 
Cohen’s Kappa statistic measures the amount of non-chance agreement two 
coders achieve. Jean Carletta, Assessing Agreement on Classification Tasks: 
The Kappa Statistic, 22 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 249, 252 (1996). In this 
study, mean pair-wise, per-case-file Cohen’s Kappa was 0.52. 
Interpretations of the Kappa statistic are “clearly arbitrary” but provide 
“benchmarks.” J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of 
Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977). 
Landis and Koch provide the following interpretations: 0.21–0.40 “fair,” 
0.41–0.60 “moderate,” 0.61–0.80 “substantial,” and 0.81–1.00 “almost 
perfect.” Id. The calculation of agreement did not include thirty-eight 
artifacts that we coded using an approach that did not preserve individual 
coders’ codes (case files 12.01, 12.02, 13.01, 13.02, 15.01, 16.01, 17.01 and 
17.03).  
2021 Precedent as Rational Persuasion       169 
the argument and marked all that applied. For example, if the author 
cited the case to support a quotation at one point in an argument 
section but as an example at another point in the same argument 
section, I instructed the coder to count both use types. There were five 
defined uses to which arguments put cases and a catch-all category 
for uses that did not fit in the five. Each case use thus received at least 
one code. 
We coded a case use as RULE if the author cited the case to support 
a legal rule that the author asserted in the text. A rule is a statement 
that could be applied to facts to derive a legal outcome. It usually 
comes in the form of operative facts lead to/compel/suggest 
normative consequence or normative consequence results from 
operative facts. For example, ‘If a secondary use is a fair use, there is 
no liability for infringement.’123 The assertion of a rule did not need to 
be entirely clear about the direction a normative consequence will go 
based on operative facts.124 
We coded author citations to a case to support an assertion about 
what courts often, usually, or generally do as GENERALIZATION. 
Generalizations thus commonly began with certain phrases, such as 
‘Courts have traditionally . . .’ or ‘Courts have routinely . . . .’ Such cue 
phrases were not necessary, though. It was common for a string cite 
to follow a generalization, and in that event, each of the cases in the 
string cite was usually supporting the generalization. 
Where the author cited a case to support a claim that some policy 
underlies the law in this area, we coded it as POLICY. A policy 
statement tells us the why of a rule or legal principle. It might 
generally be understood to be the complex assertion that some 
consequence is good and that some rule or practice is justified because 
it brings about that consequence.125 
Where the author cited a case to support a quotation from the case 
in a section of the argument, we coded it as QUOTATION. Coders 
marked this option even if the quotation appeared only in a 
parenthetical after the case citation. 
Where the author cited a case as an example of a court deciding a 
case in this body of law and for which the author provided some facts 
123 See the examples for this and other codes in Part III of Larson, supra note 
12.   
124 Consider 13.01.00 CU09, where the author implied but did not directly 
state that the secondary user’s use of more of the original work would make 
the use less likely transformative. 
125 See DOUGLAS WALTON, CHRIS REED & FABRIZIO MACAGNO, ARGUMENTATION
SCHEMES 332 (2008) (describing the “Argument from Positive 
Consequences”). 
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from the cited case, the cited case’s outcome, or both, or for which the 
author at least impliedly compared or contrasted facts of the case with 
the instant case, we coded it as EXAMPLE. Sentences referring to cases 
that begin with ‘In Case Name . . .’ often offered examples. The ‘In 
Case Name . . .’ heuristic did not always work, though. 
If we believed the argument segment cited the case for some other 
purpose (whether or not we marked it for any of the five previous 
purposes), we marked the case use as OTHER USE and added a 
comment in the note field in the database indicating what purpose we 
thought it was. Sometimes it was unclear what use the author was 
making of a case. Many times, the addition of a parenthetical 
explanation to a citation could have helped a great deal. Other times, 
the use was clear, but it was not among those in the coding scheme.126 
Part II has described the selection and collection of data for this 
study and described the text segmentation and coding strategies 
developed for it. Part III offers the findings. 
III. Findings
In this study, I identified 1810 argument segments in the 
arguments relating to copyright fair use127 in a total of 199 artifacts, 
trial-court opinions and lawyers’ briefs that gave rise to them. I then 
coded each case use in each section to categorize it according to 
whether it proved a rule, supported a generalization, provided an 
example of a previously decided case, asserted a policy justification 
for a rule, supported a quotation, or served some other purpose, with 
many case uses serving more than one of these purposes.  
I have assessed the findings along several dimensions to answer 
two research questions:  
RQ1. To what uses did the judges and attorneys put citations to 
previous cases in their opinions and briefs in the artifacts 
selected for study here?  
RQ2. With what relative frequency did they use cases in these 
ways? 
The research questions responded to theoretical questions raised 
in Part I, and particularly whether the legal-topoi theory Professor 
Provenzano and I put forward finds evidence in these data. Section 
II.C. provided a preliminary answer to RQ1 and the coding categories
used to answer RQ2.
126 Part III.B. provides further elaboration of what I found. 
127 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text. 
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Part III.A first looks at the artifacts and the frequency of case uses 
within them to answer RQ2. There I note that all legal authors use 
cases to support rule assertions relatively frequently. They use them 
as examples of how the law is applied less frequently, and they use 
them to support policy statements less frequently still. This fits with 
the theoretical perspective of the legal topoi.128 But practices vary 
significantly between advocates and judges, between advocates on the 
winning and losing side, and between advocates supporting and 
opposing motions.  
Finally, Part III.B tracks back to the first research question. In 
Part I.C, I developed a list of coding categories based on the pilot 
study. But after coding more than 5600 case uses, it is possible to 
review those coded OTHER to see if there are any common (or even 
uncommon but interesting) types of case use not in the original 
taxonomy. The uses that I found made rational and tactical appeals.129 
Part IV interprets these findings. 
A. Coded Case Uses in These Legal Arguments
This section reports the findings of this study regarding the 
practices of judges and advocates using cases in artifacts—opinions 
and briefs. It first provides an overview taking into account all the 
artifacts in the study. From a genre-theoretic perspective, it is also 
useful to consider whether different authors, responding to different 
social situations, may have made different choices about how to use 
cases.130 
I categorized artifacts and report findings here based on several of 
these potential community divisions. For example, judges’ opinions 
(n = 55) have different audiences—the parties and courts of appeals—
and different purposes—making new law, justifying a decision, 
discouraging appeals, withstanding appellate review—than do the 
briefs of the parties’ attorneys (n = 144). Attorneys writing briefs may 
face different challenges depending on whether their cases were 
strong (measured here by whether they prevailed on fair use (n = 62) 
or not (n = 54)).131 It is also possible that authors writing briefs 
seeking summary disposition of fair-use issues through motions 
(n = 68) write with a different focus than those opposing such 
128 See supra Part I.A. 
129 See infra Part III.B. For definitions of ‘rational’ and ‘tactical’ appeals, see 
text accompanying notes 23 and 25, supra. 
130 See supra notes 42, 71 and accompanying text. 
131 A small proportion of the opinions (9 or 16% of the total) provided 
outcomes that were mixed on fair use, so I did not categorize the associated 
briefs based on prevailing party. 
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motions (n = 62).132 And finally, the practices of attorneys and district 
court judges in a jurisdiction where copyright cases are more 
common—the Southern District of New York (n = 96)—might differ 
from those in other regions (n = 103). 
I gathered the applicable data and examined these subgroups of 
artifacts to ascertain if there were statistically and practically 
significant differences among them along those dimensions.133 The 
Appendix describes the statistical tests in some detail, but in simple 
terms, statistical significance measures whether the differences 
between subgroups are real, and practical significance measures 
whether they are large enough to be interesting. 
1. Characteristics Across All Artifacts
There were a great many differences among the case files and 
artifacts in terms of their lengths and the number of raw citations in 
them.134 Between 62% and 84% of raw citations were typically case 
uses. This means that most authors in these artifacts did not cite an 
opinion more than once in a single argument segment. To be able to 
compare the artifacts, I normalized most of the variables that I 
assessed by calculating their relative frequency, measured as 
frequency per thousand words. So, for example, if an artifact was 
5,834 words long and had 33 case uses, it had 5.66 case uses per 
132 A small proportion of the briefs (10 or 7% of the total) qualified as both 
supporting and opposing motions, as in the Plaintiff's Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (Nov. 5. 2012), ECF. No. 41 (artifact 12.02.41 in this 
study), in National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 
(W.D. Wash. 2012), where the party opposing a motion also makes a motion 
in its memo of opposition. There was also a small proportion of briefs (4 or 
3% of the total) where neither party was moving party, as in BWP Media 
USA, Inc. v. Gossip Cop Media, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 3d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(artifact 16.02.00 in this study), and Barcroft Media, Ltd. v. Coed Media 
Group, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 339, (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (artifact 17.04 in this 
study), where the artifacts were the parties’ post-trial briefs or letters to the 
judge. 
133 The Appendix addresses some technical issues regarding statistical and 
practical significance. For a further discussion of practical significance, see 
text accompanying infra, notes 192 and 194.  
134 As Table 2 shows, there was great variation in the length of artifacts and 
in the numbers of citations and case uses in each case file. Table 3 shows the 
same statistical characteristics (except for number of artifacts) across the 
artifacts themselves. It also provides a ratio of case uses to total raw citations 
in the artifact, where the denominator is the total number of times the case 
was cited (including ‘id.’ used to cite a case fully cited earlier). 
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thousand words.135 The mean number of case uses per thousand 
words of argument was 7.99 and the median was 7.88.136 
The central objective of this study has been to characterize the 
uses lawyers and judges make of cases. Using the coding scheme 
developed above, we can see the relative frequency with which the 
writers of these artifacts made the use of opinions to support rules, 
make generalizations, provide examples, support policy statements, 
and support quotations. 
Figure 1. Frequency of Case-Use Types per Artifact (N = 
199)137
135 This was the case with artifact 13.02.00. 
136 See Table 4 in the Appendix. 
137 See Table 4 in the Appendix for underlying data. 
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Figure 1 depicts the findings in a box plot.138 It shows the 
significant difference in relative frequencies between RULE and 
QUOTATION case uses and the others. Indeed, if we compare the inter-
quartile range (IQR) or typical range of RULE case uses (3.26 – 6.90) 
and QUOTATION case uses (3.82 – 6.99) per 1000 words, we can see 
that they overlap very substantially, occurring with similar frequency 
across the sample. Typical ranges of case uses coded as POLICY (0.31 
– 1.85 / 1000 words) and GENERALIZATION (0.00 – 1.36) were the least
common, again overlapping very substantially with each other.
Occupying the gap between the most and least common case uses is
the typical range of case uses coded as EXAMPLE (1.45 – 3.73 words). I
interpret these findings in Part IV.
2. Opinion Artifacts vs. Brief Artifacts
Because judges’ opinions have different audiences and purposes 
138 This is a form of data display that may require some explanation. In a box 
plot, the box represents the interquartile range of the values, with the vertical 
line across it indicating the median value. The horizontal lines extending 
from the boxes—sometimes called ‘whiskers’— represent 1.5 times the inter-
quartile range (IQR). If there are any outlier values beyond the whiskers, 
they are represented with small circles. The box-and-whiskers plots have the 
virtue of representing both the dispersion and skewness of the data. So in 
Figure 1, for example, we can see that the values for RULE case uses are 
clustered in the IQR between 3.36 and 6.90 uses per 1000 words and those 
for EXAMPLE case uses between 1.45 and 3.73, while the outliers span a larger 
range, up to 15.33 for RULE and 8.92 for EXAMPLE. The values for these two 
statistics are thus fairly tightly dispersed around the medians, but notice that 
both values exhibits some skewness: the RULE values are slightly left-skewed, 
because the portion of the box to the left of the median is slightly larger than 
that to the right. The EXAMPLE values are slightly right-skewed. 
The box-and-whiskers plot exhibits one characteristic that may seem 
counterintuitive to readers familiar with bar charts and histograms. In bar 
charts and histograms, the size of a bar indicates how many observations fall 
within the category indicated by the bar: the more observations, the bigger 
the bar. With the box plot, the size of the box indicates the dispersion of the 
values. So in Figure 1, if we look at example case uses, we can see that the 
part of the box to the right of the median is larger than the part of the box to 
the left. This does not mean that there are fewer observations in the area 
represented by the left part. In fact, there are exactly as many observations 
represented by the right part of the box as represented by the left—one 
quarter of the observations in the sample. The comparative thinness of the 
left portion of the box represents a concentration of one quarter of the overall 
values in a smaller range; the comparative thickness of the right part of the 
box represents a lower concentration, one quarter of the overall values in a 
larger range. 
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than parties’ briefs, it was likely that they might exhibit different case-
use characteristics. As it happens, lawyers and judges made use of 
cases as RULE and EXAMPLE with significantly different frequencies. 
The frequency of case uses to support a RULE is greater in opinions 
than in briefs; the opposite is true for EXAMPLE case uses, where 
opinions use them less frequently. Figure 2 presents the data. 
Figure 2. Case Uses in Briefs (n = 144) & Opinions (n = 
55)139
Consequently, there are practically significant differences in the 
frequency of use between briefs and opinions in two of the case-use 
139 See Table 5 in the Appendix for underlying data. 
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categories: RULE and EXAMPLE. The apparent difference between 
briefs and opinions on the other three categories is more modest and 
not, in my view, practically significant.140 Taking the RULE category 
first, the medians were noticeably different between briefs and 
opinions. There is also a difference in dispersion of the values in that 
the relative frequency of RULE units was typically in the range of 2.99 
– 6.37 / 1000 words, while in an opinion, the typical range was 4.68
– 7.772.141 Overall, then, it is fair to say that the typical relative
frequency of case uses to support a RULE is greater in opinions than in
briefs. The opposite is true for EXAMPLE case uses, where opinions use
them less frequently; the typical range for briefs being 1.70 – 3.84,
and for opinions 0.89 – 2.50. I discuss possible interpretations of
these differences in Part IV.
3. Briefs from Prevailing vs. Non-Prevailing Attorneys
Lawyers with winning cases—that is, cases where the law and
facts favor them—may have a tendency to use different arguments 
than lawyers who have losing cases.  
140 They were, however, statistically significant for GENERALIZATION and 
POLICY. 
141 Recall that I use ‘typical’ to refer to values falling within the interquartile 
range; I refer to values above or below that as ‘unusually’ large or small. 
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Figure 3 shows that there are a few significant differences in these 
data. It is pretty easy to see that the briefs of prevailing parties 
included more case uses of every kind. As Table 6 shows, that 
difference was the only one between subgroups on case uses overall 
that was practically and statistically different. The differences are 
practically significant for QUOTATION (prevailing IQR 4.79 – 7.30 / 
1000 words; non-prevailing IQR 2.85 – 6.28) and somewhat less so 
for EXAMPLE (prevailing IQR 2.17 – 4.48; non-prevailing IQR 1.14 – 
3.81) and POLICY (prevailing IQR 0.35 – 2.03; non-prevailing IQR 0 – 
1.45).142
142 The differences were statistically significant for all types of case use except 
GENERALIZATION. 
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Figure 3. Briefs of Prevailing (n = 62) & Non-Prevailing (n 
= 54) Parties143 
Of course, this correlation tells us nothing about causation. We 
cannot say that a brief with more case uses is more likely to cause a 
court to rule in the party’s favor. Neither can we claim, based on these 
data, that having a losing case makes it harder for advocates to find 
cases to use in their arguments. And we cannot rule out other factors 
that might cause both a party’s victory and a propensity to use more 
cases in briefs. I discuss the implications of these findings in Part IV. 
4. Briefs from Moving vs. Non-Moving Attorneys
It is possible that advocates in an offensive stance—those making 
motions—use cases differently than advocates in a defensive stance—
143 See Table 6 in the Appendix for the underlying data. 
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those opposing motions. As it happens, there were practically 
significant differences between these two kinds of advocates in two 
types of case use. Moving parties use RULE case uses more often than 
non-moving parties (moving-party IQR 4.15 – 6.58 / 1000 words; 
non-moving, 2.71 – 5.90). They also use QUOTATION more often 
(moving-party IQR 4.33 – 7.34; non-moving, 2.92 – 6.22). I interpret 
these findings further in Part IV. 
Figure 4. Briefs Making (n = 68) or Opposing (n = 62) 
Motions144 
5. S.D.N.Y. Artifacts vs. Other Jurisdictions
Recall that fully ninety-six of the 199 artifacts in this study come 
144 See Table 7 in the Appendix for the underlying data. 
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from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. This is a function of that court sitting in the traditional 
publishing center of the country. A random selection of copyright 
cases is much more likely to present examples from there than from 
any other district. Is it possible that artifacts from this copyright-rich 
jurisdiction would exhibit case-use characteristics different than 
those from other jurisdictions?  
Figure 5. Artifacts from S.D.N.Y. (n = 96) or Other Courts 
(n = 103)145 
I used the Southern District as the basis for my comparison, as 
only six artifacts from this study that were from the Second Circuit 
145 See Table 8 in the Appendix for underlying data. 
2021 Precedent as Rational Persuasion       181 
were not from that district, and I expected that other districts courts 
in the Second Circuit might be more like district courts in general than 
they are like the Southern District. I examined whether the practices 
of advocates and judges in this court differed from those in other parts 
of the country.146 Figure 5 displays my findings. 
As it happens, there are some significant differences between 
authors writing in the Southern District of New York and those 
writing elsewhere. The differences in QUOTATION (S.D.N.Y. IQR 4.33 
– 7.95; other courts, 3.60 – 6.19) and POLICY (S.D.N.Y. IQR 0.49 –
1.98; other courts, 0.11 – 1.55) appear practically significant.147
Because this study focused on one kind of argument before these
courts—fair use in copyright cases—we cannot say from these data
whether the propensity to use cases more as QUOTATION and POLICY
in the Southern District of New York is restricted only to cases of this
kind or runs the gamut of cases before that court. I interpret these
findings in Part IV.
B. OTHER Case Uses
Everything old is new again, they say. After tackling Research 
Question 2 in the previous section, I want to return to Research 
Question 1. Based on the pilot study described in Part II, I chose the 
coding categories that I have been discussing in Part III. It would be 
fair for the reader to ask, however, how many of the units later coded 
in the study did not fall into any of the categories I previously 
identified in the pilot study. Perhaps we overlooked some category in 
the pilot study that we should have had from the beginning? Recall 
that coders applied the OTHER code to indicate that the author 
appeared to be using a case for something other than, or in addition 
to, the five categories I identified in the pilot study: RULE, 
GENERALIZATION, POLICY, EXAMPLE and QUOTATION. As the QUOTATION 
code commonly appeared in all case uses, regardless of the rational or 
tactical appeal the author appeared to be making, I decided to review 
instances of OTHER that appeared in conjunction with the four rational 
appeals, and those of OTHER that appeared alone or only with 
QUOTATION. 
To prepare this section, I reviewed all the case uses coded as 
146 Comparing artifacts from the Second Circuit (n = 99) with those from 
other circuit-court territories (n = 100) produced similar results. Comparing 
artifacts from the Ninth Circuit (n = 38) with those from other circuit-court 
territories (n = 161) did not produce statistically or practically significant 
differences. 
147 Differences between those authors on POLICY, EXAMPLE, and QUOTATION 
are all statistically significant. 
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OTHER and the coder notes associated with them to see if any common 
(or uncommon but still interesting) uses appeared among them. Of 
the 5638 coding units, 637 or 11.3% received an OTHER code, while 
only 383 or 6.8% were coded either as QUOTATION, as OTHER, or as 
both without also being coded as RULE, GENERALIZATION, POLICY, or 
EXAMPLE. This examination is less systematic and more preliminary 
than the previous section, and so I will avoid making many 
quantitative or comparative assessments.148 
First, the most common OTHER use, present in nearly a quarter of 
them and commonly associated with the one or more of the four 
rational appeals, was what I call the ‘stitched application’ or ‘stitched 
quote.’ Next in frequency, at around 6%, was what I call the ‘parting 
quote’ or ‘parting cite,’ a tactical appeal. Four rational appeals 
appeared in between 2% and 4.5% of the OTHER units: distinguishing 
a case, citation to an earlier opinion in the instant case, use of a case 
to interpret another case’s holding or a statute, and use of a case to 
assert some non-legal fact about the world. I discuss these uses briefly 
below. 
1. The Stitched Quote or Application
One OTHER case use stood out as being very frequent, marking 
some 24% of all case uses in the study. I call it the ‘stitched quote’ or 
‘stitched application.’ It was widely dispersed, appearing at least once 
in ninety-three different artifacts. In the stitched quotation form, the 
advocate would make a claim about the instant case, weaving it 
together with a quotation, again usually from an authoritative case. In 
this situation, the case use was also coded with one of the other 
rational appeals. An example will be helpful. 
In the quoted material below, the author, a secondary user and 
defendant opposing a motion for preliminary injunction made by Fox 
Broadcasting Company, the rights holder, discussed the fourth fair-
use factor. The suit was before the District Court for the Central 
District of California. The second sentence of the excerpt shows a 
148 Note first that I concluded that around 4% of the case uses coded OTHER
probably should not have been. Often, this was because one of the two 
original coders did not see a rational appeal or QUOTATION, marking the unit 
as OTHER, but later agreed in conference with the other coder that one of the 
rational appeals was present. In the future, using these methods, it might be 
wise to ask the original coders to remove the OTHER code in this instance. It’s 
also true that coders may have missed uses of cases other than the four 
rational appeals that I identified above because their attention was focused 
specifically on those four. Future research will have to address that 
possibility. 
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stitched quote/application, where the author asserted that Fox had a 
burden but finished the sentence with a quotation of a Supreme Court 
case, Sony. 
12.07.71 CU14–CU16149 
 The fourth factor requires consideration of “the 
effect of the [defendant’s] use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107; CU14 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 590 (1994). Because the consumer’s use is
noncommercial, Fox bears the burden to show “by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful
likelihood of future harm exists.” CU15 Sony, 464 U.S.
at 451; CU16 Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral
Majority Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“when the use is noncommercial, the copyright owner
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that there is ‘some meaningful likelihood of future
harm’”). 
 Just as in Sony, however, Fox “fail[s] to carry [its] 
burden . . .” 464 U.S. at 451. In Sony, the content 
owners argued, in much the same vein as Fox here, 
that their economic advertising model was in severe 
danger and that a huge threat existed that, if the VCR 
were permitted, there would be an end to all television 
programming as we know it. As set forth in the Rapp 
Declaration, the entertainment industry has a habit of 
claiming that the sky is falling when new technology is 
introduced. Rapp Decl. ¶¶41-57. As history now shows, 
the frantic claims (“Boston Strangler”) of doom were 
wrong. The Court in Sony considered all such 
arguments and concluded that Universal had failed to 
carry its burden. It endorsed the district court’s view 
that Universal’s evidence of harm in that case was 
“speculative” and/or “minimal.” 464 U.S. at 454. 
From the stitched quote, the reader could not tell whether Sony 
stated a rule to the effect that a copyright owner bears the burden of 
proving market harm when the secondary user shows its use was non-
commercial. The coders here might have inferred that it stood for that 
rule based on the citation to and quotation from a different opinion, 
Hustler Magazine, but that opinion was not binding upon this court. 
The coders therefore did not code Sony as a RULE. They did however, 
149 Footnote omitted. 
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code it as an EXAMPLE, based on the author’s use of it in the second 
paragraph.150 
An author might use the same pithy phrase in a stitched 
application as a rational appeal by couching conclusions about the 
instant case in the actual words of a prior, often authoritative opinion; 
and as a parting quote, where only the value as a tactical appeal is 
evident. Compare these two excerpts: 
18.03.37 CU64 
Moreover, Defendant’s copying of the Photograph was 
unnecessary to achieve Hearst’s news reporting purpose. 
As noted by Judge Easterbrook in CU64 Kienitz v. Sconnie 
Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2014), “[t]he fair-use 
privilege under § 107 is not designed to protect lazy 
appropriators.” In this case, there were at least four legal 
alternatives available to Defendant which did not include 
the “lazy appropriation” of Otto’s work: (1) Hearst could 
have published its informative story without any photo 
whatsoever; (2) Hearst could have published the 
Article using other photographs of President 
Trump . . . .151 
This excerpt is from a rights holder’s brief, the part of the argument 
addressing the third fair-use factor, how much of the original work 
the secondary user took. The citation to the Kienitz case (which was 
not binding before this New York district court) stopped a bit short of 
being a RULE, as it did not define what counts as ‘lazy,’ and this was 
the first reference to that case in the brief. Nevertheless, the author 
proceeded to present instant facts that the author believed would 
paint the secondary user as a lazy appropriator. Compare the second 
excerpt. 
150 A further example appears in artifact 13.08.1032. At the very end of the 
secondary user’s fair-use argument, the point where it might have chosen to 
balance the four factors, it concluded: “Taken together, the public-minded 
and scholarly purpose of the [secondary uses] . . . compels a finding that the 
public purpose of copyright law ‘would be better served by allowing the use 
than by preventing it.’ Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251.” The quotation is from Blanch 
v. Koons, a Second Circuit case binding on the district court in this artifact.
But we have no statement of any rule about balancing the factors from
Blanch nor any facts from Blanch to show how that case balanced the factors.
At most, this could perhaps be read as a policy statement (and indeed, that
is how we coded it) from a binding court stitched together with an assertion
about the instant case.
151 Citations to the record in the case omitted.
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15.05.00 CU14 
The net result of this Court’s first factor analysis is 
unavailing. On the one hand, the transformative 
purpose and non-commercial nature of the Flyer 
weigh in favor of Defendants. On the other hand, 
Defendants did not need to use the Photograph in 
order to effectuate their criticism, and the fair use 
privilege “is not designed to protect lazy 
appropriators.” Id. [citing Kienitz] 
In this excerpt, from a court’s opinion in the Northern District of 
Illinois, where Kienitz is binding, the court had previously cited the 
case for a couple points unrelated to the one made here. But here, at 
the close of the argument section, the judge stitched the quote from 
Kienitz, the first time we see this language in the opinion, into a 
statement about the instant case. Perhaps the judge wished only to 
grab a pithy phrase from a cited case to wrap up the argument section. 
In fact, uses of cases as stitched quotes and stitched applications 
accounted for more of the OTHER uses in judges’ opinions (around 
29%) than in advocates’ briefs (around 23%). 
2. The Parting Quote or Citation
A common technique both among judges and advocates was what 
I call the ‘parting quote’ or ‘parting citation.’ These were quotations 
or citations to authorities that were either binding (and perhaps well 
known) or offered pithy expressions with which an argument’s 
proponent could end their argument. Making up more than 6% of the 
OTHER case uses (and more than 1% of total case uses), this practice 
was fairly widely dispersed, appearing in forty-five different artifacts. 
Consider this example from the Southern District of New York, 
which is the rights holder’s entire argument regarding the second fair-
use factor: 
17.06.115 CU 16–18 
“Jimmy Smith Rap” is a Vivid and Personal 
Recollection by Jimmy Smith of the Album. 
Defendants claim that “Jimmy Smith Rap” is a “thin” 
copyright because it is “a short statement of a 
purportedly factual nature with a significant amount 
of unprotected material.” (Def. Memo. pp. 14, 17). 
Pound Cake does not simply copy the facts that the 
record company provided champagne in the studio, or 
that the A&R men told them what to record, but Jimmy 
Smith’s subjective recollection and comments. As the 
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Supreme Court stated in CU16 Feist Publications, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 344, 348 (1991):
“Others may copy the underlying facts from the 
publication, not the precise words used to present 
them”. Defendant’s reliance upon CU17 Swatch Grp. 
Mgmt. Serv. Ltd. is misplaced because the Court there 
was faced with the publication of a recording of a 
financial meeting at which non-copyrightable financial 
facts and figures were announced. There was no 
personal expression or comment involved. 
 Jimmy Smith Rap is clearly a creative expression 
which lies “close to the core of copyright protective 
purposes.” CU18 Campbell supra, at 586. The second 
factor therefor favors Plaintiffs. 
Here, CU16 supports a RULE statement from a Supreme Court 
case, which the brief’s authors implied is inconsistent with the 
secondary user’s conduct described in the previous sentence. CU17 is 
an EXAMPLE used to distinguish a Second Circuit precedent previously 
cited by the secondary user. But what is the purpose of citing 
Campbell, another Supreme Court case, in the second paragraph? The 
brief’s authors did not assert any rule, policy, or generalization from 
Campbell; nor did they supply facts from Campbell to use it as an 
example. This parting quote can only function to wrap up a discussion 
of the instant case, apparently cloaking it in authoritative language 
from a high court. It is difficult to see the rational value of the use of 
this quotation, but it is not difficult to see the tactical or purely 
persuasive value: Citing an authoritative case as a parting shot in an 
argument segment may appear to give more weight to the writer’s 
conclusion. 
Again, use of cases as parting quotes and parting cites accounted 
for more of the OTHER uses in opinions (around 8%) than in briefs 
(around 6%). 
3. Other Rational Appeals
The four miscellaneous rational appeals that occasionally 
appeared in the OTHER units were distinguishing a case, citation to an 
earlier opinion in the instant case, use of a case to interpret a statute 
or another case’s holding, and use of a case to assert some non-legal 
fact about the world. The first of these, distinguishing a case, typically 
co-occurred with the EXAMPLE rational appeal for the simple reason 
that they were typically used as counterexamples. Consider artifact 
17.02.46, supporting the secondary user’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings on grounds of fair use, arguing that its work was a parody 
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of The Grinch Who Stole Christmas. 
17.02.46 CU30–31152 
[The secondary user] did not merely use elements of 
Grinch to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in 
working up something fresh. CU30 Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 580. Therefore, the case that [the secondary 
user] anticipates [the rights holder] will rely upon, 
CU31 Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997), is 
distinguishable. That [ . . .] decision, which affirmed a 
preliminary injunction in favor of [the rights holder], 
concerned a poetic account of the O.J. Simpson double 
murder trial entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat! A 
Parody by Dr. Juice, which the [secondary user] 
alleged was a fair use of the well-known The Cat in the 
Hat by Dr. Seuss. Id., at 1396. The Ninth Circuit 
rejected the [secondary user’s] argument that the work 
at issue was a parody, finding that “the substance and 
content of The Cat in the Hat is not conjured up by the 
focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O.J. 
Simpson trial.” 109 F.3d at 1401. Here, in contrast, [the 
secondary user’s] writing not only mimics Grinch’s 
rhyming style, but the text has a critical bearing on the 
substance and style of Grinch. [The secondary user] 
did not randomly select any-old [sic] popular work to 
tell a story about a topical news event, like the OJ 
Simpson trial. The [secondary work] is a Christmas-
themed work that conjures up Grinch and comments 
on Grinch as part of a newly created original work of 
authorship. 
Here, the author anticipated that the rights holder’s opposition to this 
motion would cite Dr. Seuss and distinguished it even before the 
rights holder could strike. We coded this case use as an EXAMPLE, 
because the author provided facts about Dr. Seuss and its outcome 
and then explicitly contrasted it with the instant case. The vast 
majority of case uses coded as OTHER that I found were distinguishing 
were also coded as EXAMPLE. 
An exception to that rule, and a poorly executed version of this 
appeal, appears in artifact 17.07.32, where the entire discussion of the 
second fair-use factor consists of these two sentences: 
152 Footnotes omitted. 
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17.07.32 CU10 
The second factor (the nature of the copyrighted work 
as creative and expressive and not factual) 
indisputably weighs in [the rights holder’s] favor. The 
Work is expressive and does not merely recite facts like 
the names and addresses in a phone book. CU10 See, 
e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 344-45 (1991). 
This author had not cited Feist previously and never cited it directly 
again. Probably the only way the coders would have recognized this as 
an EXAMPLE is if one or both of them had known that Feist was a case 
about copyrights in a telephone book. That did not happen, and they 
coded it only as OTHER. But because I am familiar with Feist, I believe 
the author intended this paragraph to distinguish the instant case 
from Feist.153 As a consequence of the co-occurrence of EXAMPLE with 
this kind of OTHER, I consider the latter a subcategory of the former. 
In fact, given my sense that drawing case distinctions is very common 
and expected, it’s possible that the coders in many instances just 
coded them as EXAMPLE and never noted an OTHER use in the file. That 
might explain the relative sparsity of this type of OTHER, which 
appeared in only nineteen of the artifacts (less than 10%) in this study. 
One rational appeal, evident in about 4% of the OTHER case uses 
(and less than 1% of total case uses) was citation to an earlier opinion 
in the instant case. So, for example, in 15.09.00 CU27 the judge cited 
her own earlier opinion in the same case for a proposition upon which 
she relied in her present opinion. This phenomenon occurred only 
where a case had a sufficiently long history for there to be prior 
published opinions, and only in nine (less than 5%) of the artifacts in 
this study.154 Were I to revise the coding guide for this study, I would 
likely give this type of case use its own category tag. 
A third miscellaneous rational appeal is the use of a case to 
interpret another case’s holding. This appeal marked less than 4% of 
the OTHER case uses and was dispersed across only twenty-seven (less 
than 14%) of the artifacts in this study. A good example is a footnote 
in artifact 18.03.52, where the author attempted to discount cases 
their opponent cited or rules their opponent derived from them. 
153 Of course, that was not a fair-use case, and at this point in the fair-use 
analysis, the advocate should be asserting how creative the original work is, 
not whether it’s copyright-protected at all. 
154 Case files 12.01, 12.05, 15.07, and 15.09. 
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18.03.52 CU76–79 
Plaintiff’s citation to CU76 Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. 
v. H.R. Industries, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) is inapposite because the image at 
issue in that case was used to introduce a section for 
special effects advertisers and not for any of the 
preamble uses in § 107 of the Copyright Act, and in any 
event that decision was vacated by CU77 Richard 
Feiner & Co., Inc. v. H.R. Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 901 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
Here, CU76 cited the trial-court opinion in Feiner and immediately 
distinguished it on its facts. We coded it as EXAMPLE and OTHER 
(distinguished). The author then cited the appellate opinion in Feiner 
in CU77 to explain to the instant court the weight it should give to the 
trial-court opinion: none. We coded it as EXAMPLE—because the facts 
and outcome were known—and OTHER (interpretation). Anecdotally I 
observed that advocates often distinguished their opponents’ cases in 
footnotes, though I did not try to observe the practice systematically. 
This is perhaps to downplay the presence of those cases in the author’s 
brief, but it may be risky to commit one’s effort to distinguish the 
opponent’s case to a part of the authors brief the reader may never 
read. Other instances of interpretation include ones where the author 
would comment on the history or importance of some inquiry.155 
The final miscellaneous rational appeal was the use of a case to 
assert some non-legal fact about the world. For example, several 
artifacts cited Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,156 for the 
proposition that paradigmatic fair uses like news reporting and 
criticism are carried out for profit in the U.S., supporting the 
argument that such activities do not automatically fail on the first fair-
use factor.157 This type of OTHER appeared in only twenty case uses 
across the whole study (less than 0.5%). 
The six appeals discussed in this section accounted for more than 
500 of the case uses that we marked as OTHER. There were a few other 
peculiarities, including points where we simply could not figure out 
why an author was citing a case, but they did not make up a 
substantial portion of the OTHER case uses or of the total case uses. 
155 E.g. 12.07.79 CU02 (asserting relevance of transformativeness in context 
of a court decision before Campbell); 18.01.00 CU07 (citing a case that 
stresses the importance of analysis of the first fair-use factor). 
156 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994). 
157 E.g., 12.05.00 CU03, 12.05.64 CU15, 15.06.166 CU11. 
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IV. Discussion
This study set out to begin answering the question: ‘How do 
judges and advocates use cases in their arguments?’ It did so by asking 
two specific research questions relating to a corpus of 199 artifacts, 
the copyright fair-use arguments in fifty-five court opinions between 
2012 and 2018 and the 144 advocates’ briefs that gave rise to them: 
RQ1. To what uses did the judges and attorneys put 
citations to previous cases in their opinions and 
briefs in the artifacts selected for study here? 
RQ2. With what relative frequency did they use cases in 
these ways? 
This Part first discusses the answer to RQ1, then generally discusses 
the extent to which the data here were consistent with the theory of 
legal topoi Professor Provenzano and I advanced, described in Part I. 
This Part also discusses the differences in relative frequencies of 
certain types of case uses between opinions and briefs and between 
briefs written by authors in different socio-legal positions. Finally, it 
considers limitations of the study and suggests further research. 
A. Uses Authors Made of Cases
The answer to Research Question 1 is that judges and advocates in 
these artifacts tended to cite previous court opinions to make rational 
appeals, the most common being to support the assertion of a rule, 
policy, or generalization or to illustrate the application of a rule with 
an example.  
The most common use of a citation, though, was to support a 
quotation from a cited case. This type of case use can be mixed in 
terms of being a rational or tactical appeal.158 In many instances, this 
was an empirical rational appeal, as that term is defined above.159 
When authors cited cases to support their characterization of a rule, 
generalization, or policy, for example, they commonly quoted some 
language from the cited case in that support—that observation about 
the cited text is empirical. A quotation offers rational advantages over 
a brief or opinion writer’s paraphrase of the underlying authority: 
Assuming the language is correctly quoted, the reader need not trust 
the argument proponent’s interpretation of the language, as a 
paraphrase would require them to do. The purely tactical (or purely 
158 For the distinction between these types of appeals, see text accompanying 
notes 23–25, supra. 
159 See supra Part I.A. 
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persuasive) value of language from an authoritative source was not 
lost on authors, however, who sometimes appeared to use quotations 
for no other reason than to cloak a statement about the instant case 
in language and a citation from an authoritative source—what I have 
described as the ‘parting quote.’160 
The only purely tactical appeal commonly observed was in fact 
this same parting quote or parting cite, where an author cited a case 
when wrapping up an argument section. Often the case cited or 
quoted was binding and influential, and often the author chose to 
quote language that was pithy and stitched together with some 
statement about the instant case. This type of case use does not 
contribute to the cogency of an argument, but it may contribute to its 
success. Of course, authors of these artifacts had many ways other 
than citing cases to make tactical appeals, including using thoughtful 
legal stylistic choices, storytelling, and other techniques.161 The 
findings of this study do not suggest that the authors were not making 
tactical appeals, just that they tended not to use citations to previous 
opinions to do so. An extension of this study’s work could examine all 
the tactical appeals in a set of artifacts. 
Among artifacts in this study, uses of cases to support rule 
statements, generalizations, policy arguments, examples, and 
quotations varied in relation to their strength in the theory of legal 
topoi.162 Uses with higher rational appeal according to that theory—
empirical appeals like RULE and QUOTATION—were more common 
than those with modest or lesser appeal—conventional appeals like 
EXAMPLE and values-based appeals like POLICY.  
I propose that this hierarchy is based on the argument 
proponent’s goal of appearing to mobilize fewer interpretive 
resources in making the argument. In the terms of linguistic and 
philosophical pragmatics, this is the extent to which they must 
account for a variety of possible meanings—or possible implicatures—
and rule out all those that will not apply.163  
160 See supra Part III.B. 
161 See supra note 27 and sources cited there. 
162 See supra Part I.A. 
163 Brian N. Larson, Bridging Rhetoric and Pragmatics with Relevance 
Theory, in RELEVANCE AND IRRELEVANCE: THEORIES, FACTORS AND
CHALLENGES 69, 79 (Jan Straßheim & Hisashi Nasu eds., 2018) (defining 
‘explicatures’ as “inferences about disambiguation of word senses and 
reference resolution” or “identification of explicit content”) (citations and 
quotations omitted); id. at 73 (defining ‘implicatures’ as “conclusions that 
the Hearer draws about what the Speaker implied, suggested, or meant that 
are different from what the Speaker said, which is closely related to the 
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When a writer presents an argument based on the actual words of 
a rule from an authoritative text (like a binding court opinion), the 
writer apparently interprets the text less than they would to apply 
some prior case precedent without a rule. As an empirical matter, the 
rule statement either is or is not in the authoritative text. The words 
of the rule statement are usually relatively small in number—often 
just a sentence; they are usually couched in the language of the law, 
using applicable terms of art; and they usually provide a fairly clear 
statement in the form of operative facts ⟶ normative consequence. 
Alternative hypotheses about the meaning of the rule—possible 
implicatures—are relatively small in number.164 The use of RULE is an 
empirical rational appeal, in that characterization of a rule as some 
set of operative facts leading to a normative consequence permits 
authors (after offering evidence of the operative facts) to move 
inexorably to the conclusion they desire. It requires no further 
interpretation. This analysis explains the relative frequency both of 
RULE and QUOTATION case uses. 
Applying an authoritative case precedent as a legal analogy using 
the common-law method, however, is considerably more complex. 
The EXAMPLE case use follows the pattern of legal analogy: A previous 
case had similar facts and came out a certain way; this case should 
thus come out the same way. This form of reasoning is conventional 
in law, though it is not in all fields.165 It is empirical in the sense that 
it contains an assertion that the law and facts cited are indeed present 
in an authoritative text. But here, the argument’s proponent must 
draw from among all the facts in the cited and instant cases those 
comparisons that are relevant to application of the law and conclude 
that any differences are not so relevant as to distinguish the 
precedent. The proponent may or may not feel the need to apply what 
Professor Schauer refers to as “categories of assimilation”166—that is, 
they may or may not feel the need to propose a covering rule that 
brings the instant case into alignment with the cited case.167 If they do 
so, however, they have the option to draw the category of assimilation 
at various levels of abstraction, all of which the precedent case may 
equally strongly implicate.168 Alternative hypotheses about the 
conventional meaning of the words uttered”) (citations and quotations 
omitted).  
164 Though there may still be very many. 
165 WEINREB, supra note 1, at 8–9. See supra Part I.A.  
166 Schauer, supra note 1, at 582.  
167 For use of the term ‘covering rule,’ see WEINREB, supra note 1, at 61 n.31. 
168 I noted previously: 
Schauer offers an example to help define what he means by 
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meaning of the text are considerably more numerous, and the need to 
choose imposes higher interpretive costs on the author and calls on 
the reader to trust the author more. The authors of the artifacts in this 
study perhaps recognized, therefore, that conventional appeals based 
on legal analogy inspire less confidence than those based on bright-
line rules. Case uses coded as EXAMPLE appeared less frequently than 
RULE, but more frequently than other types. 
Making a policy argument moves even deeper into interpretive 
territory. On the model discussed above, policy arguments in the law 
are values-based arguments, and they require the greatest 
interpretive effort on the parts of authors and readers to connect the 
arguments about the instant case.169 They are not so much arguments 
about what the law is, but rather why it is or what it should be. The 
argument’s proponent may choose from a large number of texts, 
including ones not normally authoritative in law, such as literary and 
religious texts, may search for motivations behind statements of rules 
and decisions in previous cases, and so on. The possible implicatures 
the author could draw from such materials are vast in number, 
making it very difficult to reject most meaning determinations and 
settle on one. Accepting a policy argument requires the reader to 
repose considerable trust in the author’s interpretive performance. 
Uses of cases to support arguments coded as POLICY were 
substantially less common than the other types so far discussed.  
Finally, we have the category of GENERALIZATION, the least 
frequently used, which is complicated by a couple problems. First, the 
coders on this project found it difficult to agree when to assign this 
code.170 The category should capture argumentative uses of cited cases 
categories of assimilation. He asks us to “[i]magine a faculty meeting 
considering a request from a student for an excused absence from an 
examination in order to attend the funeral of his sister.” Assuming 
the faculty grants the request without comment, for what is it a 
precedent? Can students expect to be excused “to attend the funerals 
of grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, nephews, close 
friends, and pets”? The answer, he tells us, depends on how broadly 
the category of assimilation is drawn. The decedent in the first case 
could be characterized as “a sibling, a relative, a blood relative, and 
one with whom the student has a ‘meaningful relationship.’” 
Larson, supra note 1, at 680–81 (quoting Schauer, supra note 1, at 577–79) 
(notes omitted). 
169 See supra Part I.B. 
170 Initial pairwise observed agreement (86.62%) and Cohen’s Kappa (0.20) 
were lower on this category than any other. For discussion of inter-rater 
reliability on this study, see supra, note 122. 
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that “support an assertion about what courts often, usually, or 
generally do.”171 It was common, however, for one coder to see an 
expression like “commercial use generally weighs against fair use” as 
a generalization while another might see it as a rule (possibly subject 
to exception or countervailing considerations). Second, the 
GENERALIZATION is something like a cross between an EXAMPLE and a 
RULE, making its rational argumentative appeal less certain. Given 
enough EXAMPLEs of cases similar in a certain way to the instant case 
that come out a certain way, the author or reader might attempt to 
universalize the similarity as the operative facts of a RULE statement. 
Here, the GENERALIZATIONs appeared to happen in cases where the 
author was not quite prepared to claim that the statement was a rule. 
On the other hand, GENERALIZATION sometimes appeared in case uses 
where the author cited only one case; it’s difficult to see how a single 
example supports a generalization across cases. 
In summary, uses by authors of cases in this study were generally 
consistent with the hierarchy of rational appeals that Professor 
Provenzano and I previously described, with RULE and QUOTATION 
units, which make empirical appeals, each about twice as common as 
EXAMPLE units; EXAMPLE units, which make conventional appeals, 
about twice as common as POLICY units; and POLICY units, which make 
values-based arguments, quite rare. The GENERALIZATION units were 
rare even by those standards, though, probably because they are 
neither fish nor fowl (that is, neither RULE nor EXAMPLE) from writers’ 
and readers’ perspectives. 
In short, assuming in each case that the argument’s proponent has 
accurately represented the authorities on which the argument relies, 
the reader must trust the proponent more to have correctly 
interpreted those authorities if the argument is values-based or 
conventional than if the argument is empirical. It may be, however, 
that advocates and judges choose to use cases, at least in part, due to 
considerations other than persuasive effect.172 In other words, 
perhaps the most frequent is not necessarily the most effective. This 
question would benefit from further research of the kind described 
below. 
B. Variations Across Genres or Communities
This study showed that there were practically and statistically 
significant differences in relative frequencies of the types of case uses 
described here depending on whether the author was a judge or 
171 See supra Part I.B. 
172 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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advocate, prevailing or non-prevailing advocate, party moving for or 
opposing a motion, and writing in the Southern District of New York 
or elsewhere. As Toulmin noted, argumentation forms are field-
dependent.173 Genre theory suggests that the typical communicative 
or argumentative response to a typical social situation will vary with 
the discourse community in which it occurs.174 Swales offered some 
defining characteristics of a discourse community.175 Considerably 
more research may help to explain the difference, but I offer some 
speculations here to set the agenda for that research. 
First, why might judges use RULE more frequently and EXAMPLE 
less frequently than advocates? When judges write opinions to justify 
their decisions, they are in a considerably different position than the 
advocates who argue that the judges should take one position or 
another. The judge’s decision has binding effect on the parties, until 
and unless one or more of them appeal the decision. But most appeals 
fail, probably because within the options available, judges usually 
provide plausible justifications for the outcomes they select. 
Advocates, on the other hand, petition the judge to select their 
arguments over those of their opponents. They may feel it is necessary 
to provide a wider range of arguments to buttress their positions.  
Judges also represent institutional interests, and at least in this 
sample, they are appointed for life tenure. As a consequence, they may 
wish for their decisions to be perceived as logically compelled rather 
than a judgment call (so to speak) between the positions of the parties. 
Judges in this situation may seek to appear as a matter of institutional 
credibility to engage less in interpretation of the law and more in its 
application. As I explained above, the QUOTATION and RULE case uses 
arise in the empirical legal topos, which is to say that they require least 
interpretation. Judges use cases to set out legal rules more often than 
advocates do.  
Advocates, on the other hand, offer more EXAMPLES, certainly in 
an effort to guide the judge in interpreting the rules that the court 
must apply. In addition to seeking to make decisions that appear 
logically compelled, judges may be more reluctant to rely on examples 
than advocates because the legal effect of a precedent case may be 
arguable enough to result in a higher likelihood of reversal on appeal. 
173 He noted: “[t]he sorts of evidence relevant in [legal] cases of different 
kinds will naturally be very variable. To establish negligence in a civil case, 
willful intent in a case of murder, the presumption of legitimate birth: each 
of these will require appeal to evidence of different kinds.” Toulmin, supra 
note 28, at 16. 
174 SWALES, supra note 71, at 24–27.  
175 Id. 
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So, for example, a trial-court judge may be concerned that the court 
of appeals will distinguish a case upon which the trial-court judge 
relies for an example. It is an easy matter for the appeals court to say 
that the cited case is not relevantly similar, or is relevantly dissimilar, 
to the instant, so that the holding in the cited case is not compelled in 
the instant case. For the appeals court instead to contradict the trial 
court’s statement of a rule might require the appeals court to offer an 
exception and a rationale for it. 
One reviewer of this article suggested that an advocate trying to 
persuade the judge might use EXAMPLEs as a way of showing the judge 
that their peers have already ruled the advocate’s way in other cases, 
making the judge feel safer in making that determination in the 
instant case.176 Judges, on the other hand, are not motivated to show 
that any herd mentality governs them but rather wish it to appear that 
legal rules compel their decisions. 
Prevailing advocates used QUOTATION, EXAMPLE, and POLICY 
significantly more often than non-prevailing advocates. I have 
described these differences as both statistically and practically 
significant. The former is a conventional measure and the latter a 
statistical threshold that I selected for this study. One question that 
immediately presents itself is whether readers would note such 
differences. That requires further study. If these differences are 
visible to the skilled legal reader (like a judge or other advocate), it 
may be true to say that a brief with certain characteristics looks like 
what could fairly be called a ‘losing brief,’ potentially giving it 
diminished credibility. But this study does not provide evidence that 
losing briefs cause litigation losses. It may just as plausibly be that 
weak cases make only certain types of arguments practicable. There 
may also be some other cause(s) mediating both the form of the briefs 
and the outcomes of the cases.  
Moving parties’ advocates used RULE and QUOTATION more often 
than non-moving parties’ advocates. These differences may well be a 
function of the burden placed on the moving party: to offer sufficient 
legal authority for its position and show the court that it is entitled to 
relief. The non-moving party need only show that the moving party’s 
argument is sufficiently infirm so as to make the relief it seeks 
unavailable. As a consequence, the non-moving parties may be 
focusing their arguments on attacking the arguments of the moving 
briefs rather than attempting to make independent arguments relying 
on other cited cases. Nevertheless, we might expect that the non-
176 Personal correspondence with Professor Kevin Bennardo. Copy on file 
with the author. 
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moving party would need to call on authorities for legal rules just as 
frequently as the moving party, and the difference observed here 
prompts inquiry into their practices. 
Finally, the question of geography is an interesting one. The 
authors in the Southern District of New York—a jurisdiction 
commonly associated with copyright actions—used more QUOTATION 
and POLICY than authors in other jurisdictions. Their greater use of 
EXAMPLE was also statistically but not practically significant. There is 
an extent to which we might expect practice to be fairly consistent 
across federal districts, but I suspect too that no one would be 
surprised to hear that lawyers in Texas, for example, write differently 
than lawyers in California. The community of lawyers practicing 
before the federal bar may well have subcommunities, and as genres 
are properties of (sub)communities, it may well be that certain 
practices become commonplace in some but not others. It may also 
be that copyright cases in SDNY draw judges and advocates who are 
more experienced or interested in copyright matters and that this 
conditions in some way the kinds of arguments they make.  
C. Limitations & Future Research
This study is a start toward answering the big question: How do 
judges and advocates use cited cases in their arguments? But it is also 
subject to some limitations. First, it looked only at artifacts relating to 
one subject matter in the law, focused on one level of the federal 
judiciary. This was a deliberate choice, because other legal subject 
matter and other levels of court might exhibit systematically different 
practices. The only way to see that is to study them separately. The 
choice of copyright—a fact-intensive field with roots in judge-made 
policy—might have inflated the extent to which advocates and judges 
made use of EXAMPLE and POLICY here. Study of a more rule-based 
area of the law would help to assess the magnitude of any such 
difference. I suggest too that further study should examine artifacts 
from appellate cases, initially at least, in the same field—copyright 
law—but also more broadly. Appellate judges have different roles and 
are subject to different constraints than district-court judges. They 
may also tend to have different kinds of experience before reaching 
the bench.  
I have described some differences noted above as practically and 
statistically different. Others can check my math on statistical and 
practical significance by examining the data.177 It is impossible to say 
now, however, whether the typically trained legal reader would detect 
177 See Larson, supra note 12. 
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those differences, whether I have categorized them as practically 
significant or not. The question matters: If readers recognize the 
differences between briefs written in the winning and losing styles 
suggested by these findings, lawyers would be well-advised, whatever 
the quality of their cases, to emulate the briefs of prevailing advocates. 
If the distinction is invisible to readers, it may still be of theoretical 
interest without being something that advocates lose sleep over. 
Experimental study—exposing readers to different densities of case 
uses in short texts—would be valuable to answer that question.  
As for the other potentially different communities of authors—
opinions vs. briefs, moving vs. non-moving parties, SDNY authors vs. 
others—and the differences in their practices those communities 
mediate, further research might explore judges’ and advocates’ 
practices using social-scientific methods such as qualitative 
interviews, surveys, and ethnography. These efforts could provide 
clearer insight into the differences. 
The data from this study also have further insights to offer. The 
corpus and data here provide an opportunity to examine both the 
arguments advocates make and the reactions of their opponents and 
judges. For example, some scholars debate whether using a legal 
analogy without asserting a deductive rule in its application can result 
in a cogent argument. This study has indeed identified instances 
where authors have used legal analogies (EXAMPLES here) without 
rules. A deeper qualitative examination of these data will show 
whether such arguments exhibit apparent flaws in reasoning and 
whether they generate normative censure from opposing advocates 
and judges.178 Similar qualitative deep dives are possible regarding 
the use of rule and policy arguments more generally. Case uses also 
illustrate questions of legal theory by allowing the researcher to show 
how a case the moving party cites elicits a response from the opposing 
party and then the judge. This would meaningfully extend a previous 
study that looked at the uptake of cases cited in briefs—their 
‘stickiness’—by examining whether judges cited the same cases.179 The 
findings would be important for legal theory and practice given the 
role of adversarial argumentation as a truth-finding mechanism and 
its relation to the dialectic nature of legal argumentation.180 Other 
avenues open to exploration with the data already collected for this 
study are whether the patterns are different for cited cases that are 
binding vs. non-binding and for court opinions that are appealable vs. 
178 I’m preparing the findings of that study now. 
179 See Bennardo & Chew, supra, note 52. 
180 I’m preparing the findings of that study now, as well. 
Precedent as Rational Persuasion       199 2021 
those that are not. 
Conclusion 
This article answered two research questions, puzzle pieces in the 
larger originating question of how judges and advocates make use of 
cases in their arguments. Though this is the first published 
systematic, empirical study that explores how lawyers and judges use 
cases in their arguments, it should not be the last. Legal theorists can 
make productive use of the corpus of artifacts and data from this 
study, and they can conduct their own studies with the methods 
developed here, or with their own extensions of them.  
All these findings are significant in that they characterize the 
practices of these authors in such a way that they may inform 
metanormative legal theory. This study showed that the advocates 
and judges here exhibited the preferences that the theory of legal 
topoi expected: a preference for the empirical topos, followed by the 
conventional, and finally the values-based topos. And the findings 
here showed the magnitude of those preferences.  
These findings have significance for lawyers, particularly those 
findings that suggest the brief of a party with a good case might look 
different than the brief of a party with a bad case. I would caution 
advocates not to change their writing practices until we can see 
whether these apparent differences appear in other types of cases and 
whether they are detectable by legal readers.  
Finally, these findings have significance for legal pedagogy. To the 
extent that teachers of legal theory and writing emphasize a group of 
approaches on the metanormative grounds that they are best 
practices, those teachers should know the practical norms to which 
the profession will expect students to conform once they get out of law 
school. To the extent that law teachers’ pet methods and 
metanormative theories differ from the realities of practice, they 
should at least give students a heads up that what they must do in law 
school classes may look different—perhaps very different—from what 
practical norms expect them to do. 
The findings in this study invite further research in at least three 
areas. The first relates to the methods described particularly in this 
article. I might call the second area the study of ‘reader reception’ of 
the kinds of texts studied here. And the third takes the rhetorical 
perspective, seeking to understand how authors think their 
construction of legal arguments will persuade their audiences.  
First, scholars should use the methods described here to study 
arguments in other parts of the law: substantive law other than 
copyright, courts other than federal courts, levels other than the trial 
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court, etc. It may also be interesting to see how the methods apply to 
analyses outside the litigation context: For example, genres like the 
office memo, to the extent it still exists.181 If the patterns observed 
here are borne out there, they point to broad practical norms across 
American legal practice. If they are not, the findings here may 
describe only the practices of the types of authors studied here, and 
we should be able to account for the differences in practical norms 
based on differences in the relevant communities of argument 
proponents.182  
Second, scholars should examine whether the differences in 
argumentative practice—say between advocates who prevail before 
the court and those who do not—are noticeable to legal readers. A 
researcher could begin this work using surveys, presenting skilled 
legal readers with texts that vary in the relative frequency of use of the 
various types of case use. It should be possible experimentally to 
determine whether they even notice the differences described above. 
Qualitative interviews might also be useful for understanding legal 
readers’ perceptions of these differences, if any.  
Finally, scholars should explore the decisions that proponents of 
legal arguments make while deciding what is the best means to 
persuade their audiences, whether it is the court persuading the 
parties that they should not appeal its decision or the appeals court 
that it should not reverse it, or it is the advocate seeking or opposing 
the grant of some relief from the court. Legal argumentation is 
dialogic, and understanding how these arguments’ proponents 
anticipate responses from their audiences has important implications 
for legal theory, practice, and pedagogy. 
181 See Kirsten K. Davis, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: 
Reading and Writing Objective Legal Memoranda in a Mobile Computing 
Age, 92 OR. L. REV. 471, 482 (2013) (critiquing critiques of the “traditional 
legal memorandum”). 
182 Of course, further studies might also uncover flaws in this study or its 
methods. 
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Appendix 
Section A explains how to obtain the coding guide and dataset 
associated with this article. Section B offers a simple statistical 
description of the dataset. Section C explains the use of statistical tests 
and the data presentation in this article. Section D supplies the tables 
upon which the figures above are based. 
A. Data Repository
 “Coding Guide & Replication Data for ‘Precedent as Rational 
Persuasion’” is a dataset in the Texas Data Repository including the 
coding guide discussed in this article and all the original textual 
artifacts and data from which the findings in this study derive.183 
Those materials are available for other researchers, who may use 
them to replicate, criticize, or extend this study. 
Any researcher can obtain these materials by navigating to 
https://doi.org/10.18738/T8/SXNR02, selecting all the files, and 
clicking the “Download” button. The data repository will generate a 
.ZIP file that the researcher can download. The downloaded file is 
between 124 and 125 megabytes in size. Uncompressing the .ZIP file 
places the applicable files into a file structure that makes them easier 
to navigate than they are on the data repository website. 
B. Description of Dataset for this Study
The corpus for this study included sections of arguments from and 
related to fifty-five court opinions, and for each opinion, between zero 
and six briefs.184 I called the opinion and its related briefs a ‘case file.’ 
In all, the fifty-five case files included a total of 199 artifacts. The 
histogram in Figure 6 shows how many case files had each number of 
artifacts associated with it.185 
183 See generally Larson, supra note 12. 
184 It may be surprising that there was a single instance where we coded an 
opinion but none of its briefs. Case file 14.06 amazingly had only one artifact, 
the court’s opinion in Calibrated Success, Inc. v. Charters, 72 F. Supp. 3d 
763 (E.D. Mich. 2014). All three relevant briefs (ECF Nos. 11, 15, and 16) 
mention fair use, but none has a single citation to a court opinion in support 
of that discussion!  
185 The outliers here deserve a brief mention: For case file 14.06, which had 
only one artifact, see supra note 184. Case file 14.03 had only two artifacts, 
the court’s opinion in Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689 (W.D. Va. 2014), 
and the defendant’s motion, Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Nov 26, 2013). The plaintiff did not 
oppose the defendant’s motion with a brief. On the other end of the spectrum 
is White v. West Publishing Corp., 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), an 
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Of the opinions, twenty-one (38%) ruled on fair-use issues for the 
rights holders; twenty-five (45%) for secondary users; and nine (16%) 
went partially for one side and partially for the other.186  
Because many of the businesses engaged in producing and 
distributing creative works in the United States are based in New York 
and California, federal districts sitting in those states were sources of 
a majority of the opinions, while several other districts were also 
represented, as Table 1 shows. While evaluating the findings, I 
considered whether artifacts from these courts reflected differences 
from those from elsewhere.187 
Figure 6. Number of Artifacts Coded per Case File (N = 55) 
opinion precipitated by three motions for summary judgment (one by the 
plaintiff and one by each of two defendants), with a brief on each side of each 
motion. 
186 Failure to add to 100% is due to rounding. We did not record data for 
whether an opinion favored the moving or non-moving party because the 
opinions frequently adjudicated cross motions for summary judgment or 
dismissal, making both parties effectively moving and non-moving. 
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The portions of those artifacts that we coded—all related to the 
question of fair use—totaled 767,980 words and represented 8225 
raw citations to court opinions. They cited a total of 529 different 
court opinions. Table 2 summarizes statistics relating to case files and 
shows the mean number of words per case file was 13,963. The mean 
number of raw citations per case file was 150. 
C. Statistics & Data Presentation
I have avoided tables of data in the text of this article, preferring 
to reserve them for the Appendix. Most of the tables show 
interquartile ranges of the variables they present. I present the data 
this way because the IQR provides a better impression of the typical 
range of values for a variable. The interquartile range is the range 
within which the central 50% of the values fall; below the lower value 
are roughly 25% of the observations, and above the higher value are 
roughly 25% of the observations.188 I use these boundaries in this 
article when describing a value as ‘unusually low’ or ‘unusually high.’ 
My rationale is that it is helpful for the reader to know more than just 
whether a value is above average—around half the values in a non-
skewed distribution with few or no outliers will be—or below average. 
In this article, if I say a value is ‘unusually high (low),’ I mean it is 
outside the IQR and therefore higher (lower) than 75% of the values. 
Similarly, when I refer to a value as ‘typical,’ I mean only to say that it 
falls within the IQR. Calculating IQRs also permits visualization of 
data with a box-and-whisker plot, something I use in the article and 
explain upon its first use.189 
Some of the findings presented in Part III show differences 
between subsets or categories of the data: for example, between briefs 
and opinions, between texts from the Southern District of New York 
and from other districts, etc. I focus the presentation of comparative 
findings in Part III and the discussion in Part IV on differences that I 
describe as both statistically and practically significant.  
Statistical significance really just measures the probability that 
the difference observed in two samples accurately measures a 
difference that exists in the broader population. In short, it measures 
how likely it is that the difference between the two sample values is 
real. The result is usually expressed with a p-value, with the threshold 
188 I say ‘roughly’ because I performed all statistical tests using R Studio, and 
the quartile functions in R Studio count the median value (if it exists in the 
observations and is not calculated as the mean of the two values in the middle 
of the sample) as part of the second and third quartiles. It gets counted twice, 
and consequently, ‘roughly’ is appropriate here. 
189 See supra note 138. 
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for significance (called alpha) established by the researcher and 
commonly accepted to be 0.05 in much social science research. 
Parametric tests of significance require that the sample have a 
Gaussian—sometimes called ‘normal’—distribution. I used the 
Shapiro-Wilk test to assess whether the categories here appeared in a 
Gaussian distribution.190 Case uses overall and QUOTATION case uses 
were in Gaussian distributions, but the coding categories RULE, 
GENERALIZATION, POLICY, and EXAMPLE were not. For categories in 
Gaussian distribution, I used the parametric Welch Two Sample t-test 
for statistical significance, and for non-Gaussian distributions the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test with continuity correction, each with alpha = 
0.05.  
‘Practical significance,’ as I use the term, just means that a 
statistically significant difference in the measurement of two samples 
may have some practical importance. The traditional statistical 
measure for the latter is a test for the effect size of the difference 
between the two samples. There are many possible tests for effect size. 
Unfortunately, they are often represented in arbitrary numerical 
ranges that are hard for the layperson to interpret. Perhaps the easiest 
to make sense of is Vargha and Delany’s A,191 which is what I have 
chosen to use here.192 In principle, this statistic expresses the 
probability that a randomly selected member of one sample will be 
higher than a randomly selected member of the other sample. The 
higher the value of A, the greater the effect size. I’ve selected a 
threshold value of 0.62 (rounded to two decimal points) as the cut-off 
for practical significance.193 All of the differences reported here that 
are practically significant are also statistically significant. 
As it happens, the threshold I have chosen for practical 
190 I performed all statistical tests using R Studio. 
191 András Vargha & Harold D. Delaney, A Critique and Improvement of the 
“CL” Common Language Effect Size Statistics of McGraw and Wong, 25 J. 
EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 101, 102 (2000). 
192 This statistic bears a linear relationship to Cliff’s delta, with which some 
readers may be more familiar. Id. at 104. 
193 The researcher-selected threshold is always arbitrary, but there is not a 
conventionally accepted value here as there is with alpha. Vargha and Delany 
propose that the effect size is “small” where A ≥ 0.56, “medium” where A ≥ 
0.64, and “large” where A ≥ 0.71. Id. at 106. In my view, any medium or large 
effect size would be practically significant, but I also believe it’s wise to relax 
that standard slightly for purposes of this study. The best practice going 
forward would be to study how big the effect size needs to be before a reader 
is likely to perceive any difference in an argument based solely on the size of 
this effect. 
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significance (A ≥ 0.62) corresponds closely to an informal visual test 
that the reader without statistical training can apply to the box plots 
in the figures in Part III. Generally, a difference is practically 
significant when the median in one category is very near or beyond 
the end of the IQR in another category. Take the example of the RULE 
category in Figure 2. There, the median value for briefs is 4.85, just 
above the lower end of the IQR for opinions (4.68). In other words, 
above that threshold are about 75% of the opinions and only 50% of 
the briefs.194 Even though the median for briefs is just above the lower 
end of the IQR for opinions, I would count it practically significant 
because of the apparent overlap in Figure 2. This eyeballing of the 
differences generally corresponds to the statistical test of practical 
significance.195 
194 Note that in this case, one could look just as easily at the median for opinions 
(6.23), which is just below the upper end of the IQR for briefs (6.37). If the 
distribution of either statistic had more skew, this reciprocal relationship might not 
hold. 
195 This is a heuristic method, of course, and there is no statistical reality that compels 
this correspondence in any given instance. Vargha and Delaney’s A is not 
isomorphic with the IQR for the values. 
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D. Tables
Table 1. Source Courts of Opinion Artifacts in this Study (N 
= 55) 
Court No. of 
Opinions 
C.D. Cal. 7 
D. Az. 1 
D. Colo. 1 
D. Mass. 1 
D. Md. 2 
D. Mont. 1 
D.P.R. 1 
E.D. Mich. 1 
E.D. Mo. 1 
E.D. Tex. 1 
M.D. Fla. 1 
M.D.N.C. 1 
N.D. Cal. 1 
N.D. Ga. 2 
N.D. Ill. 3 
N.D. Miss. 1 
N.D. Ohio 1 
N.D.N.Y. 1 
S.D.N.Y. 24 
W.D. Va. 1 
W.D. Wash. 1 
W.D. Wis. 1 
Total 55 
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Table 2. Statistical Characteristics of Case Files (N = 55) 
Mean 
(std dev) 
Median Min / Max Interquartile 
Range 
No. of Artifacts 3.62 
(1.02) 
3 1 / 7 3 – 4 
No. of Words 13,963.27 
(13,259.41) 





101 14 / 521 71 – 210 
No. Case Uses 102.71 
(79.51) 
72 12 / 405 52 – 134 
Table 3. Statistical Characteristics of Artifacts (N = 199) 
Mean 
(std dev) 
Median Min / Max Interquartile 
Range 
No. of Words 3,859.20 
(3,739.10) 






33 0 / 185 18 – 52.5 
No. Case Uses 28.39 
(22.70) 
23 0 / 150 13 – 38 
Ratio: Case Uses 
/ Raw Cites 
0.72 
(0.17) 
0.72 0.14 / 1.00 0.63– 0.84 
208 The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute          Vol. 25 
Table 4. Normalized Raw Citations and Case Uses per Artifact (N = 199) 
Mean (std 
dev) 
Median Min / Max Interquartile 
Range 




11.33 0 / 20.33 9.47 – 14.10 




7.88 0 / 17.70 5.97 – 10.16 




5.25 0 / 15.33 3.26 – 6.90 
Generalization 




0.51 0 / 5.70 0.00 – 1.36 




0.92 0 / 6.34 0.31 – 1.85 




2.41 0 / 8.92 1.45 – 3.73 




5.36 0 / 15.33 3.82 – 6.99 
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n Min / Max
Interquartil
e Range 
Total CUs / 1000 
words 
Briefs 7.85 (3.31) 
Opinions 8.33 (2.55) 
Rule / 1000 words ** 
Briefs 4.92 (2.77) 4.85 0.00 / 
15.33 
2.99 – 6.37 
Opinions 6.22 (2.20) 6.23 0.94 / 
11.09 
4.68 – 7.77 
Generalization / 1000 
words * 
Briefs 0.81 (1.03) 0.38 0.00 / 4.68 0.00 – 1.23 
Opinions 1.16 (1.24) 0.76 0.00 / 5.70 0.06 – 1.73 
Policy / 1000 words * 
Briefs 1.06 (0.98) 0.85 0.00 / 4.69 0.20 – 1.75 
Opinions 1.51 (1.29) 1.21 0.00 / 6.34 0.60 – 2.28 
Example / 1000 words 
** 
Briefs 2.93 (1.79) 2.85 0.00 / 8.92 1.70 – 3.91 
Opinions 1.86 (1.15) 1.76 0.00 / 5.15 0.98 – 2.46 
Quotation / 1000 
words 
Briefs 5.35 (2.59) 5.18 0.00 / 
15.33 
3.57 – 6.89 
Opinions 6.09 (2.42) 6.01 0.74 / 
11.49 
4.27 – 7.56 
Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between 
briefs and opinions is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are designated with a single 
asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically significant at A ≥ 0.62 with 
two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for details regarding assessment 
of statistical and practical significance. 
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n Min / Max
Interquartile 
Range 
Total CUs / 1000 
words ** 
Prevailing 8.71 (2.86) 8.67 2.22 / 17.35 6.80 – 10.49 
Non-prevailing 7.12 (3.53) 6.93 0.00 / 
17/70 
4.81 – 8.25 
Rule / 1000 words * 
Prevailing 5.44 (2.46) 5.52 1.08 / 14.61 3.84 – 6.43 
Non-prevailing 4.68 (3.04) 4.43 0 / 15.33 2.83 – 6.24 
Generalization / 1000 
words 
Prevailing 0.89 (1.05) 0.51 0.00 / 4.68 0.00 – 1.41 
Non-prevailing 0.85 (1.14) 0.36 0.00 / 4.42 0.00 – 1.29 
Policy / 1000 words ** 
Prevailing 1.31 (1.12) 0.97 0.00 / 4.69 0.35 – 2.03 
Non-prevailing 0.85 (0.83) 0.60 0.00 / 2.88 0.00 – 1.45 
Example / 1000 words 
** 
Prevailing 3.26 (1.72) 3.05 0.00 / 8.92 2.17 – 4.48 
Non-prevailing 2.58 (1.97) 2.33 0.00 / 8.11 1.14 – 3.81 
Quotation / 1000 
words ** 
Prevailing 6.05 (2.18) 5.88 1.91 / 12.94 4.79 – 7.30 
Non-prevailing 4.71 (2.81) 4.30 0.00 / 
15.33 
2.85 – 6.28 
Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between 
briefs of prevailing and non-prevailing parties is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are 
designated with a single asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically 
significant at A ≥ 0.62 with two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for 
details regarding assessment of statistical and practical significance. 
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n Min / Max
Interquartile 
Range 
Total CUs / 1000 
words 
Moving 8.35 (3.24) 7.99 0 / 17.35 6.43 – 10.25 
Opposing 7.24 (3.20) 7.37 1.32 / 17.70 4.81 – 9.31 
Rule / 1000 words ** 
Moving 5.63 (2.89) 5.42 0 / 15.33 4.15 – 6.58 
Opposing 4.25 (2.33) 3.85 0 / 10.55 2.71 – 5.90 
Generalization / 1000 
words 
Moving 0.87 (0.97) 0.55 0 / 3.83 0.00 – 1.46 
Opposing 0.73 (1.02) 0.27 0 / 4.42 0.00 – 1.16 
Policy / 1000 words 
Moving 1.27 (1.11) 0.92 0 / 4.69 0.32 – 1.94 
Opposing 0.87 (0.81) 0.73 0 / 2.88 0.23 – 1.56 
Example / 1000 words 
Moving 3.03 (1.80) 2.99 0 / 8.11 1.71 – 3.86 
Opposing 2.72 (1.86) 2.47 0 / 8.92 1.44 – 3.90 
Quotation / 1000 
words ** 
Moving 6.00 (2.72) 5.36 0 / 15.33 4.33 – 7.34 
Opposing 4.64 (2.22) 4.73 0.45 / 9.78 2.92 – 6.22 
Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between 
briefs of moving and non-moving parties is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are 
designated with a single asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically 
significant at A ≥ 0.62 with two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for 
details regarding assessment of statistical and practical significance. 
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n Min / Max
Interquartile 
Range 
Total CUs / 1000 
words 
S.D.N.Y. 8.35 (3.42) 7.97 0.68 / 17.70 6.03 – 10.54 
Other courts 7.64 (2.78) 7.74 0.00 / 17.35 5.97 – 9.29 
Rule / 1000 words 
S.D.N.Y. 5.25 (2.85) 5.42 0.00 / 15.33 3.17 – 6.87 
Other courts 5.30 (2.53) 5.10 0.00 / 14.61 3.34 – 6.90 
Generalization / 1000 
words 
S.D.N.Y. 1.02 (1.20) 0.70 0.00 / 5.70 0.00 – 1.43 
Other courts 0.80 (0.99) 0.36 0.00 / 3.71 0.00 – 1.34 
Policy / 1000 words ** 
S.D.N.Y. 1.38 (1.12) 1.22 0.00 / 6.34 0.49 – 1.98 
Other courts 1.00 (1.04) 0.76 0.00 / 5.86 0.11 – 1.55 
Example / 1000 words 
* 
S.D.N.Y. 2.92 (1.76) 2.60 0.00 / 8.92 1.75 – 4.03 
Other courts 2.37 (1.60) 2.12 0.00 / 8.11 1.31 – 3.09 
Quotation / 1000 
words ** 
S.D.N.Y. 6.22 (2.78) 6.05 0.00 / 15.33 4.33 – 7.95 
Other courts 4.93 (2.18) 4.98 0.00 / 
10.74 
3.60 – 6.19 
Mean frequencies of case uses and case-use types for which the difference between 
from S.D.N.Y. and those from other courts is statistically significant at p < 0.05 are 
designated with a single asterisk (*) and those for which the difference is practically 
significant at A ≥ 0.62 with two asterisks (**). See supra, Part C of the Appendix, for 
details regarding assessment of statistical and practical significance. 
